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Where the Judiciary Prosecutes in Front of
Itself: Missouri's Unconstitutional Juvenile
Court Structure
Josh Gupta-Kagan
I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri law structures juvenile courts in an "unusual" manner.I State
law grants an individual known as the juvenile officer the exclusive authority
to determine which child welfare or delinquency cases to file. 2 State law also
grants juvenile court judges the authority to hire and supervise juvenile offic-
ers.3 Those same juvenile court judges then adjudicate the cases filed and
prosecuted by the juvenile officer.4 That is, in Missouri juvenile courts the
judicial branch prosecutes cases in front of itself.
This structure is unusual in multiple ways. Most obviously, it differs
from the American norm of executive branch agencies and lawyers filing and
prosecuting civil and criminal cases on behalf of the government.5 It also
differs from typical procedures followed in juvenile delinquency and child
welfare proceedings in juvenile courts around the United States, in which
executive branch officials determine which cases to prosecute and how.6 This
structure is particularly unusual in child welfare cases, in which an executive
branch agency, the Children's Division of the Department of Social Services
(Children's Division), operates a comprehensive child welfare system.7 Un-
like child welfare agencies in most other states, the Missouri Children's Divi-
sion lacks the authority to determine which cases should be filed and how to
prosecute them. In addition, juvenile officers perform many of the same
tasks as Children's Division case workers, such as making recommendations
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The author
would like to thank Doug Abrams, Annette Appell, Kathleen Dubois, Avni Gupta-
Kagan, Cortney Lollar, Clark Peters, Kathryn Pierce, and Mae Quinn for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.
1. In re M.C., 504 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo. App. E.D. 1974) ("The juvenile of-
ficer occupies an unusual position in our system of juvenile justice.").
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.351 (2000).
4. § 211.459.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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to the judge about where a foster child should live and whether the child
should reunify with a parent.9
This Article will address several issues raised by Missouri's unusual ju-
venile court structure, arguing that the structure violates the Missouri Consti-
tution's separation of powers clauses by placing prosecutorial discretion with-
in the judicial branch.' 0 By granting juvenile officers, who are subject to
judges' supervision, exclusive power to file child abuse and neglect and juve-
nile delinquency cases, Missouri law concentrates power into the hands of
one branch of government. Missouri law thus empowers individual judges to
set child welfare and juvenile justice policy by managerial decree. Subordi-
nate judicial branch officials face pressure to file and litigate cases to please
their boss, the judge, who hired them, supervises them, and has power to fire
them. And the judge faces subtle pressure to rule in favor of his or her own
employees, who are treated as first among equals in the courtroom. At the
very least, the fact that the prosecuting staff and attorney work for the judge
adjudicating the petition leads to an appearance of partiality to litigants.
This Article will also discuss the anachronism that the juvenile officer's
role represents." In child welfare cases, the juvenile officer's role has not
evolved with the modem administrative state. Missouri was one of the first
states to adopt a juvenile court, and the state simultaneously established the
juvenile officer's role in the early 1900s, before the modern administrative
state existed.12 When the modem administrative state developed in the
1930s, and especially when modem child welfare agencies developed in the
1960s and 1970s, the General Assembly charged the agency now known as
the Children's Division with investigating allegations of child abuse and ne-
glect and managing a complicated foster care system for children removed
from their parents.' 3 Unlike legislatures in forty-seven other states plus the
District of Columbia, the Missouri General Assembly has never given the
Children's Division the authority to decide, in collaboration with executive
branch attorneys, in which cases to file petitions alleging abuse or neglect or
requesting a court order placing a child in foster care.14 Instead, the General
Assembly developed the Children's Division without reforming the now
more than a century old role of juvenile officers.15
In juvenile justice cases, the juvenile officer possesses prosecutorial dis-
cretion because of the General Assembly's judgment, first, that juvenile court
personnel could best achieve therapeutic aims and, second, that such aims
take precedence over proper constitutional procedures, even before a juvenile
9. § 211.455.
10. See infra Part I1.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
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is found responsible for a delinquent act. Fulfilling therapeutic aims in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion remains appropriate and constitutes a vital
element of the juvenile justice system; but doing so at the expense of consti-
tutional protections reflects a worldview that has been untenable at least since
the Supreme Court of the United States' watershed juvenile rights decision in
1967, In re Gault. Gault makes clear that the Constitution requires basic
due process protections in cases determining whether a youth should be sub-
ject to a juvenile court's dispositional orders. Just as juvenile defendants
enjoy the essential due process protections that adult defendants have, juve-
nile defendants should be tried in a system that respects basic principles of
American government, including the separation of powers.
The juvenile officer's role raises several concerns that are unique to
child welfare cases. First, the juvenile officer's power limits the executive
branch's authority to operate a comprehensive and consistent statewide child
welfare system. 19 The General Assembly has charged the Children's Divi-
sion with operating such a system - from managing a hotline for individuals
to report suspected abuse and neglect, to coordinating voluntary services for
families without court intervention, to helping find new permanent families
for foster children who cannot reunify with their parents.20 By taking away
from the Children's Division the essential power to decide which cases need
court attention, Missouri law undermines that agency's ability to fulfill its
statutory obligations. Other states give their child welfare agencies the au-
thority to decide which cases to file in court and which to address through
less coercive means.21 As separation of powers cases establish, this result is
proper because such agencies have the most knowledge about available alter-
natives for each family and bear the consequences of filing cases. 22
The second child-welfare-specific concern is that the juvenile officer's
role wastes public resources, spending millions of dollars on personnel who
duplicate what Children's Division case workers do in child welfare cases,
such as filing reports with the juvenile court asserting their understanding of
the facts of a case and making recommendations for how the court ought to
23
proceed. The vast majority of other states operate their child welfare sys-
tems without spending resources on juvenile officers, in large part because
most of what juvenile officers do is already done by child welfare agencies. 24
Children and families need many things that cost money - two prominent
examples are more and better services to prevent and treat child abuse and
16. See infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. See id. at 30-31.
19. See infra Part IV.D.
20. See infra Part IV.D.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part Ill.A.
23. See infra Part IV.E.
24. See infra Part I.B.
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neglect and better representation for children and parents in juvenile court -
much more than they need extra public officials involved in their cases dupli-
cating work done by other public officials.
These concerns are not merely abstract; one juvenile court judge has de-
scribed phenomena in his judicial circuit that illustrate the harms predicted by
the founders' writings on separation of powers.25 Before he took the bench,
he was told that the juvenile court judge "established the criteria for which
cases would be pursued" by juvenile officers.26 Juvenile officers would dis-
courage Children's Division case workers from making recommendations
that differed from the juvenile officers' recommendations. 27 And once he
took the bench, juvenile officers sought his direction regarding how to handle
different fact patterns. 28
Nor is the problem limited to awkward interactions between judges and
juvenile officers. The Missouri structure creates an appearance of partiality,
and children and families subject to juvenile court jurisdiction observe judges
adjudicating petitions filed by their subordinates, possibly pursuant to mana-
gerial directions from the very same judge. Juvenile court litigants will rea-
sonably wonder whether they will get a fair hearing on such petitions. As the
same juvenile court judge put it, "How could litigants expect to prevail when
the judge directed which cases would be prosecuted?" 29 Moreover, the juve-
nile officer's role as a member of the judiciary exacerbates well-documented
problems with juvenile courts by creating an even tighter group of insiders
operating the system and increasing pressure on individual litigants and attor-
neys to follow the norms of that system - whether or not they serve their own
or their clients' interests.30
To address this problem, the Missouri General Assembly should mod-
ernize the juvenile code to correct the separation of powers violation and
reform the juvenile officer's role. In child welfare cases, the General Assem-
bly should empower the state administrative agency to file and prosecute
cases when necessary, thereby eliminating the need for a juvenile officer. In
juvenile justice cases, the General Assembly should separate prosecutorial
decisions from judges' control, while maintaining the existing law's com-
mitment to achieving rehabilitative aims in such decisions. A simple solution
in juvenile justice cases is to provide non-judicial supervision to juvenile
officers and their attorneys. This Article proposes that the General Assembly
25. See Memorandum from Judge Darrell Missey to Representative Rory
Ellinger, Josh Gupta-Kagan, and the Mo. Bar Ass'n Family Court Comm., at 6-7
(Oct. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Memorandum from Judge Missey] (on file with author).
Judge Missey's discussion of juvenile officers is quoted at length and discussed infra
Part IV.C.
26. See Memorandum from Judge Missey, supra note 25, at 6-7.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6.
30. See infra Part IV.B.
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create a state commission of juvenile justice experts from multiple disciplines
to appoint and supervise the chief juvenile officers in each judicial circuit.
Those officers, and not judges, would have authority to hire and manage ju-
venile officers and attorneys within their circuit. Absent legislative reforms,
the courts should hold that the present system violates the Missouri Constitu-
tion's separation of powers clauses.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II will describe the juvenile of-
ficer's unique role in Missouri law, and explain how this role makes Missouri
an outlier within the United States. Part III will argue that the juvenile of-
ficer's prosecutorial discretion violates the separation of powers required by
the Missouri Constitution and informed by the U.S. Constitution. Part IV will
describe the real world harms that flow from this violation, with a particular
focus on the harms in child abuse and neglect cases. Part V will outline po-
tential policy solutions to this problem.
II. THE JUVENILE OFFICER'S ROLE
Evaluating the constitutionality and the policy wisdom of Missouri's
juvenile court structure requires understanding its features and how the sys-
tem compares with other states' juvenile legal systems. This Part explains
how juvenile officers are judicial branch employees hired and supervised
by juvenile court judges. Missouri law empowers them to file and, either
directly or through their lawyers (who are also judicial branch employees
subject to the supervision of juvenile court judges), prosecute child welfare
and juvenile delinquency cases. That is, in juvenile court the judiciary prose-
cutes in front of itself. Juvenile officers have similar roles in both child wel-
fare and juvenile delinquency cases; while some important differences be-
tween these types of cases will be discussed later in this Article,31 the core
point of this section applies to both categories. This Part also discusses how
the role of juvenile officers in Missouri renders this state an outlier compared
to the rest of the nation.
A. The Juvenile Officer's Role in Missouri Law
The juvenile officer has an "unusual position."32 The juvenile officer
and his or her attorneys work for the judicial branch and are supervised by
juvenile court judges.33 Missouri law entrusts this judicial officer with the
discretion to choose whether to file juvenile court cases, what charges to file
31. The juvenile officer's role does vary between child welfare and juvenile
justice cases; this section will note such areas, and later Parts will explore the more
complicated differences from these implications. See infra Parts IV.A, D-E, V.A.
32. In re M.C., 504 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo. App. E.D. 1974) ("The juvenile of-
ficer occupies an unusual position in our system of juvenile justice.").
33. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.351.1 (2000).
2013] 1249
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against a parent (in child abuse and neglect cases) or against a juvenile (in
delinquency cases), and what recommendations to make to the judge
throughout the case.34 Thus, the juvenile officer serves both as a party prose-
cuting petitions and advocating particular positions through the life of a case
and as the judge's subordinate official.
Missouri law establishes that the juvenile officer and his or her attorneys
are judicial branch officials hired by, supervised by, and subject to termina-
tion by circuit or juvenile court judges. 35 The statute directs the judges to
appoint a juvenile officer who shall "serve under the direction of the court." 36
Job notices call for juvenile officer applicants to send resumes directly to
judges or to officials who are supervised by judges. 37 Once a judge appoints
a juvenile officer, the juvenile officer is under the "exclusive control" of the
judicial branch38 and the individual deputy juvenile officers are "subject to
the direction of the Chief Juvenile Officer, the Circuit Judge, and the Associ-
ate Circuit Judges."39 Juvenile officers may be terminated with or without
cause "by the judge."40 The Missouri juvenile code defines the juvenile of-
ficers' authority in reference to the judges who supervise them: the juvenile
34. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
35. Juvenile court judges appoint juvenile officers in larger jurisdictions and
circuit judges do so in smaller jurisdictions. See § 211.351.1. Larger jurisdictions
have family courts whose jurisdiction includes cases filed under the juvenile code.
See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 487.010, 487.080 (2000). Juvenile courts are thus often sub-
divisions of the family court. See § 487.080. For ease of reference, this article refers
to the juvenile court.
36. See § 211.351.1.
37. See, e.g., Juvenile Officer II job posting, 43rd Judicial Circuit (on file with
author) (directing applicants to "submit a resume with cover letter and references to
the Honorable R. Brent Elliott . . .or the Honorable Tom Chapman"). In larger juris-
dictions, a chief juvenile officer - himself appointed and supervised by a judge or
judges - hires deputy juvenile officers. See, e.g., Deputy Juvenile Officer job posting,
32S Judicial Circuit (on file with author).
38. Judicial circuits with more than one juvenile officer typically have a chief
juvenile officer, and deputy juvenile officers who are supervised by the chief. The
statute refers to the court appointing "a juvenile officer." See § 211.351.1. Deputies
are appointed via statutory authority to hire "other necessary juvenile court personnel"
who also "serve under the direction of the court." Id. Chief and deputy juvenile of-
ficers are thus both subject to judges' supervision. Accordingly, this Article will refer
simply to "juvenile officers," including both chief and deputy officers.
39. Smith v. Thirty-Seventh Judicial Circuit of Mo., 847 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Mo.
1993) (en banc); see also State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis Cnty., 451 S.W.2d 99,
102 (Mo. 1970) (en banc) (holding that the juvenile court has the inherent authority to
"select and appoint employees" and that "it is essential that [the juvenile court] con-
trol the employees who assist it").
40. Smith, 847 S.W.2d at 756-57; see also id. at 760 (Price, J., concurring) ("The
court has the inherent authority to select, appoint, and control its own staff.").
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officer shall act "under direction of the juvenile court[;]" 41 shall "[m]ake such
investigations and furnish the court with such information and assistance as
the judge may require;"42 and shall "[tlake charge of children before and after
the hearing as may be directed by the court."43 Finally, the General Assem-
bly enacted a catch-all provision: "The juvenile officer shall, . . . [p]erform
such other duties and exercise such powers as the judge of the juvenile court
may direct."44
Juvenile officers generally have lawyers representing them. These law-
yers are employed by the courts even though they are not explicitly men-
tioned in the statute, and thus are paid by the court and subject to the court's
supervision.45  They represent the juvenile officers,46 who are themselves
subject to judges' exclusive control.4 7 Lawyers serve as agents of their cli-
ents, so judges' control over juvenile officers extends to control over juvenile
officers' lawyers.
Juvenile officers hold immensely important powers throughout the life
of a juvenile court case; in the words of one court, the juvenile officer is the
juvenile court's "primal instrument" to serve abused, neglected, and delin-
quent youth.4 8 Juvenile officers' role is particularly crucial at the beginning
of cases, when they determine whether to file any case at all and, if so, what
41. § 211.401.1.
42. § 211.401.1(1) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that the re-
sults of all such investigations must be kept and reports submitted to the judge. §
211.401.1(2).
43. § 211.401.1(3) (emphasis added).
44. § 211.401.1(4).
45. Cf MO. SUP. CT. R. 116.03 (directing "counsel for the juvenile officer" to
present evidence in support of the petition). These lawyers are employed within the
"Legal Department" of particular family courts. See, e.g., FAMILY COURT OF ST.
Louis CNTY., GUIDE TO THE FAMILY COURT 23 (2010), available at http://www. stlou-
isco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/circuit%20court/Family/ 2OCourt/
NewFamilyCourtGuide.pdf (listing "Legal Department" within its auspices). Section
211.351 .1 authorizes the court to appoint "other necessary juvenile court personnel to
serve under the direction of the court." Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.351.1 (2000). Juvenile
courts hire attorneys for juvenile officers via this authority. Mo. Juvenile Law § 1.12
(MoBar 4th ed. 2011).
46. Job postings for juvenile officers' lawyers make clear that they are employed
by the court and assigned to represent juvenile officers. See, e.g., GREENE CNTY.
FAMILY COURT - JUVENILE Div., EMPLOYMENT VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT: STAFF
ATTORNEY I (2012), available at http://www.greenecountymo.org/file/PDF/Vacan-
cy.pdID= 157 and on file with author (posting that the juvenile court seeks an attor-
ney to "represent the Juvenile Office" and "meet the business needs of the Greene
County Family/Juvenile Court"); Employment Opportunity, Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit of Missouri (on file with author) (posting for chief legal counsel for the Sev-
enteenth Judicial Circuit - Juvenile Division).
47. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
48. In re F.C., 484 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Mo. App. K.C.D. 1972).
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precise offense or offenses to charge and whether to release children or keep
them in state custody.49 Missouri law authorizes police and other law en-
forcement officers and physicians to take children into their custody so long
as they bring the children directly to a juvenile officer; in both child welfare
and juvenile delinquency cases, the juvenile officer must be involved "imme-
diately."so In child abuse and neglect cases, this step can bypass the execu-
tive branch child welfare agency, the Children's Division, which would oth-
erwise investigate child abuse and neglect allegations.5 Indeed, in 2011,
forty-four percent of all juvenile court child abuse and neglect referrals came
from sources other than the Children's Division.5 2 Once a child is removed
from his or her parent or guardian (in a child welfare case) or detained (in a
delinquency case), the juvenile officer determines whether to file a child
abuse or neglect or juvenile delinquency petition, and, if filing a petition,
whether to release the child to a parent or other adult or ask a judge to ap-
prove protective custody - placing a child in the Children's Division's custo-
dy or juvenile detention pre-trial, before any allegations of parental abuse or
neglect or juvenile delinquency are proven or disproven.53 This initial custo-
dy or release decision is essential and can create a "snowball effect" that
shapes the entire litigation.54
Deciding whether to release a child or to keep a child in custody re-
quires the juvenile officer to make two determinations that are the essence of
prosecutorial discretion - first, whether there is sufficient evidence to prove
49. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
50. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.061 (2000 & Supp. 2012) (juvenile delinquency);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.125.3 (2000) (child welfare). Any statements made by the
child to the juvenile officer may be used to prove the child delinquent and are there-
fore subject to constitutional protections against self-incrimination. See Mo. SUP. CT.
R. 126.01; In re M.C., 504 S.W.2d 641, 647 (Mo. App. St. Louis D. 1974).
51. See § 210.125.2; see also infra Part IV.D (discussing the Children's Divi-
sion's statutory authorities and responsibilities).
52. See COURT Bus. SERVS. Div. & RESEARCH & STATISTICS SECTION, SUPREME
COURT OF MO., MISSOURI JUVENILE AND FAMILY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT -
CALENDAR 2011 21, available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=4133 (last
visited Oct. 7, 2013) [hereinafter MISSOURI JUVENILE AND FAMILY DIVISION ANNUAL
REPORT]. Sixty-six percent of all juvenile court child abuse and neglect referrals
came from the Children's Division. Id. The remainder came from law enforcement,
other juvenile division personnel, school personnel and others. Id. Unfortunately, the
publicly-reported data does not report how referrals from different sources were han-
dled - that is, whether the Children's Division reports were more or less likely to lead
to court action than, for instance, police or school reports.
53. See § 210.125.3 (child welfare); § 211.081.1 (child welfare); § 211.061.3
(juvenile delinquency).
54. Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089, 1100 n.14 (Conn. 1998); see also Paul
Chill, Burden ofProofBegone: The Pernicious Effect ofEmergency Removal in Child
Protection Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459 (2003) (explaining how initial
removals shape child abuse and neglect proceedings).
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facts that amount to child abuse or neglect or juvenile delinquency, and, if so,
whether to pursue an "informal adjustment" (a diversion option)55 or to file a
56 57
petition. Only the juvenile officer has authority to file a petition, so a
petition filed by an executive branch official cannot trigger juvenile court
jurisdiction. Moreover, a juvenile court judge is empowered to order the
juvenile officer, the judge's subordinate, to file a petition.5 9
After filing a petition, the juvenile officer assesses the family and rec-
ommends particular actions to the court. The juvenile officer is a party to
all juvenile court cases6 and is charged with presenting evidence in support
of a petition at trial - the traditional role of a prosecutor.62 Once a judge de-
cides that a parent abused or neglected a child, the juvenile officer makes
recommendations at disposition and later hearings regarding where the child
should live, what the permanency plan ought to be, and what services are
appropriate for the family.63 Similarly, in juvenile delinquency cases, once a
judge decides that a child committed a delinquent act, the juvenile officer
makes recommendations regarding the disposition of the child.6
In child abuse and neglect cases, a juvenile officer may petition the
court to terminate parental rights,65 an action that the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri has called the "civil death penalty."66 Even when another party files a
termination of parental rights petition, the juvenile officer must be joined as a
party to the case,67 and the judge may order the juvenile officer to perform an
"investigation and social study" to be shared with the court and all parties. 68
Termination cases also trigger a statutory requirement that "the juvenile of-
ficer shall meet with the court" to discuss service issues and the investigation
55. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 112. A juvenile officer monitors an informal adjustment
and retains the discretion to file a petition at any time. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 112.03(b)(6).
56. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 111.01(b).
57. Mo. Juvenile Law § 6.37 (MoBar 4th ed. 2011) (Section 211.081.1, RSMo
2000, vests in the juvenile officer exclusive authority to file petitions alleging child
abuse or neglect.).
58. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 323 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. App. Springfield 1959).
59. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 111.01(c).
60. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.141.4 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
61. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 110.04(a)(20).
62. MO. SUP. CT. R. 116.03.
63. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 124.07(d)(2)-(3), 124.08(b)(5).
64. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 128.03(c)(1).
65. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.444.1 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
66. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
67. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.3 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.455.3 (2000). The statute provides that the judge may
order the juvenile officer, the state child welfare agency, a public or private foster
care agency, or "any other competent person" to complete the investigation and social
study. Id.
2013] 1253
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and social study;69 these meetings exclude other parties to the termination
case. During the ensuing trial, the juvenile officer may call witnesses and
present evidence in support of the termination petition.70
In all juvenile cases, the juvenile officer has the same authority as any
other party to seek review of trial court decisions; the juvenile officer may
move the juvenile court to modify its dispositional orders, 7' to seek review of
commissioners' rulings by a juvenile court judge,72 and to appeal from ad-
verse rulings.73
Beyond these formal powers, juvenile court rituals often underscore
the juvenile officer's authority in comparison to other parties and lawyers.
For instance, in St. Louis County,74 where I practiced and co-taught a law
school clinic,75 the juvenile officer or his attorney enters the appearance of
all parties and counsel at any hearing, including opposing parties and counsel.
The more egalitarian norm of each attorney standing up to introduce her-
self and her client is not followed. In post-adjudication hearings, the juvenile
officer or his attorney generally collects any reports or evidence filed by
any party and provides them to the judge, rather than each party introducing
them directly.
Missouri statutes, case law, and practice make several points clear. Ju-
venile officers, and the lawyers who represent them, are subject to the control
of juvenile court judges, who hire, supervise, and can fire them. Juvenile
officers hold all prosecutorial discretion - the authority to determine whether
to file a juvenile court case, what specifically to file, and what relief to seek -
and exercise it in front of the very same judges who hold supervisory authori-
ty over them. And this prosecutorial authority, coupled with their judicial
branch status, can make juvenile officers first among the purportedly equal
parties within the courtroom.
B. The Juvenile Officer Makes Missouri an Outlier
The American Bar Association (ABA) recommended in 1980 that juve-
nile "intake" authority - the authority to bring a child into custody and deter-
69. § 211.455.1.
70. §211.459.1.
71. § 211.251.2.
72. § 211.029.
73. § 211.261.1. Consistent with criminal defendants' rights to avoid double
jeopardy, a juvenile officer, like an adult criminal prosecutor, may not appeal a judg-
ment acquitting ajuvenile of a delinquency charge. Id.
74. I base the assertions in this paragraph on my experience in St. Louis County
only and acknowledge that the practice may differ in other judicial circuits.
75. From 2011 through 2013, 1 co-taught the Civil Justice Clinic: Children and
Family Defense Project at the Washington University School of Law. The clinic
represented children and parents in child abuse and neglect cases. Most clinic cases
were heard in the St. Louis County Juvenile Court.
1254 [Vol. 78
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mine whether to file a petition regarding that child - should reside in the ex-
ecutive branch, not the judiciary.76 The ABA observed that "constitutional
issues" arise if that authority resides in the judiciary, and that the trend among
states was to make such decisions "independent of judicial control."77 Other
national entities issued similar recommendations decades earlier. As early as
1966, the federal Children's Bureau recommended that the power to investi-
gate allegations of abuse and neglect and to file and prosecute child abuse and
neglect petitions reside in an executive branch agency, not a juvenile court.78
The Children's Bureau wrote, in language evoking separation of powers con-
cerns, that a "court through the use of its own staff should not be placed in the
position of investigator and petitioner and also act as the tribunal deciding the
validity of the allegations in the petition." 7 9
Nearly all states have adopted this separation of powers. Thirty-seven
states plus the District of Columbia have statutes explicitly empowering ad-
ministrative agencies or executive branch attorneys to file petitions initiating
juvenile court cases.80 All of these states give the executive such prosecutori-
76. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 15-18 (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS
RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION].
77. Id. at 17. The ABA's language seemed to suggest that judicial control
would trigger separation of powers concerns, but the ABA did not spell this out ex-
plicitly. Id.
78. CHILDREN'S BUREAU & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING WITH CHILDREN 42 (1954) [hereinaf-
ter STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS].
79. WILLIAM H. SHERIDAN ET AL., STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY
COURTS 13 (1966) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS]. As
early as 1954, the Children's Bureau had advised against court staff investigating
allegations of delinquency or child abuse or neglect: "To do so would mean that the
court, through the actions of its own representative, would be placed in the position of
petitioner with the result that the court would be sitting in judgment on its own peti-
tion." STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS, supra note 78, at 42.
80. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.020(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st
Reg. Sess. of the 28th Legis.) (allowing agency to file child abuse and neglect cases
without judicial approval); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.12.040(a)(1) (West, Westlaw
through 2013 1st Reg. Sess. of the 28th Legis.) (allowing department to investigate
delinquency allegations and decide whether to file petition); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
310(b) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (stating that only prosecutor can
file delinquency cases, any adult can file dependency cases but only the agency or
prosecutor may file dependency cases seeking ex parte emergency relief); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 325 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 311 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. & the
2013-2014 1st Ex. Sess. laws) (requiring social workers to file petitions); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 650(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 311 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. & the
2013-2014 1st Ex. Sess. laws) (mandating that the district attorney file petitions alleg-
ing delinquency); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-512 (West, Westlaw through 1st
Reg. Sess. of the 69th Gen. Assemb.) (allowing the district attorney to file delinquen-
cy petitions); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(a) (West, Westlaw through Public
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Acts of the 2013 Jan. Reg. Sess. of the Conn. Gen. Assemb.) (permitting the Commis-
sioner of Social Services, Commissioner of Children and Families, or others to file
child welfare petition); D.C. CODE § 16-2305(a), (c) (2001) (stating that only agency
with attorney general may file delinquency and neglect cases); FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1)
(2012) (allowing an attorney for the department to file dependency petition); FLA.
STAT. § 985.318(1) (2012) (requiring the state's attorney to file delinquency peti-
tions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-1 1 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 Reg.
Sess.) (permitting department to file petition when it decides whether to do so);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1610(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Chs. 1-354) (requir-
ing child protection petitions to be filed by attorney general or prosecutor); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 20-510 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Chs. 1-354) (allowing prosecut-
ing attorney to file delinquency petitions); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-13(1)
(West 2007 & West Supp. 2013) (stating that any person or agency may file child
protection petition); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-520(1) (West 2007) (permit-
ting state's attorney to file delinquency petition); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-34-9-1, 31-
34-9-2 (West, Westlaw through 2013) (stating that attorney for the department may
file petition that is to be accepted by the court upon a finding of probable cause); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-37-10-1 (West, Westlaw through 2013) (allowing prosecuting attor-
ney to file delinquency petition); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.87.1-.3 (West 2006) (stating
that department of human services, juvenile court officer, or county attorney may file
child protection petition); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.35 (West 2006) (requiring the
county attorney to file delinquency petitions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2214 (Supp.
2012) (stating that the county or district attorney will prepare and file child protection
petition); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2327 (Supp. 2012) (requiring the county or district
attorney to prepare and file delinquency complaints); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts.
731, 746 (West, Westlaw through the 2012 Reg. Sess.) (stating that any caretaker or
agency representative may file a complaint, and a district attorney may file a child
protection petition); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 842 (West, Westlaw through the 2012
Reg. Sess.) (permitting district attorney to file delinquency petitions); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4032(1) (2004) (stating that the department, police officer, or three or
more people may file child protection petition); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
3301(6) (2004 & Supp. 2012) (requiring the state's attorney to make file filing deci-
sion regarding delinquency petitions); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-809(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (mandating that the local department will
file child protection petition); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 24 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 76 of the 2013 1st Annual Sess.) (stating that "[a) person" may file child
protection petition, and such petition triggers a summons to the department); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 54 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 76 of the 2013 1st Annu-
al Sess.) (permitting the commonwealth to proceed by complaint or indictment in
juvenile delinquency cases); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 712A. 11(2), 712A.13a(2)
(West, Westlaw through P.A.2013, No. 106, of the 2013 Reg. Sess., 97th Legis.)
(requiring the prosecuting attorney or agency to file juvenile delinquency or child
protection petition); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260B.141, 260C.141 (West, Westlaw
through the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (stating that "[a]ny reputable person, including but not
limited to an agent of the commissioner of human services" may file child protection
or delinquency petitions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-422(2) (West, Westlaw through
the 2012 general election) (requiring that the county attorney or attorney general will
file child protection petitions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1401 (West, Westlaw
through the 2012 general election) (permitting the county attorney to file delinquency
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petition); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-274(1) (West, Westlaw through 102d Legis. 2d
Reg. Sess.) (allowing the county attorney to file delinquency and child protection
petitions); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62C.1 10 (West, Westlaw through 2011 76th Reg.
Sess.) (mandating that the district attorney prepare and file delinquency petitions);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.490 (West, Westlaw through 2011 76th Reg. Sess.)
(requiring agency to file child protection petition); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-30
(West, Westlaw through L.2013, c. 150 and J.R. No. 11) (allowing any person to file
delinquency complaints); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.34 (West, Westlaw through
L.2013, c. 150 and J.R. No. 11) (stating that the agency, county prosecutor or others,
may originate child protection proceeding); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-4 (West,
Westlaw through end of Ist Reg. Sess. of the 51st Legis.) (requiring agency to file
child protection petitions), cited in Vescio v. Wolf, 223 P.3d 371, 374 (N.M. Ct. App.
2009) (noting that the agency is the only entity empowered to file petitions); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 1032 (West, Westlaw through L.2013) (stating that the child protec-
tion agency or a "person on the court's direction" may originate proceedings); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 310.1(2) (West, Westlaw through L.2013) (requiring presentment
agencies, defined in section 254 as corporation counsel, county counsel, or district
attorneys, to file delinquency petitions); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-403 (West,
Westlaw through S.L. 2013-220 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (direct-
ing the director of the department of social services to file petitions); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 27-20-20 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 63d Legis.
Assemb.) (permitting the state's attorney to prepare and file child protection and de-
linquency petitions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-301(A)(1) (West, Westlaw
through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Legis.) (allowing the district attorney to file peti-
tions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §§ 2-2-104(A), 2-2-106(D) (West, Westlaw
through Ist Reg. Sess. of the 54th Legis.) (requiring the district attorney to approve
decision not to file delinquency petitions and allowing the district attorney to file such
petitions); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-7(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 534 of the
Reg. Sess.) (mandating that the department file petition); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-
1660 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2012 Reg. Sess.) (allowing the department to
file child protection petitions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1020 (West, Westlaw
through end of the 2012 Reg. Sess.) (permitting various public agencies to institute
delinquency proceedings); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-43 (West, Westlaw through
the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (allowing the state's attorney to file child protection or delin-
quency petitions); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.012(a), 53.04(a) (West, Westlaw
through the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83d Legis.) (requiring the prosecuting attor-
ney to review allegations and file delinquency petitions); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§
262.101, 262.105 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83d Legis.)
(stating that a "government entity" or Department of Protective and Regulatory Ser-
vices may file petition with or without taking custody of the child); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78A-6-304(2)(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 1st Special Sess.) (stating
that any person may file child protection petition after first referring cases to the Divi-
sion of Child and Family Services); VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5201(a)(2) (West,
Westlaw through law No. 53 of the 1st Sess. of the 2013-2014 Gen Assemb.) (requir-
ing that the state's attorney file delinquency petitions); VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §
5309(a) (West, Westlaw through law No. 53 of the 1st Sess. of the 2013-2014 Gen
Assemb.) (requiring that the state's attorney file child welfare petitions); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-260(A) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the 2013 Spe-
cial Sess. 1) (empowering Commonwealth, city, or county attorneys and Department
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al authority in child welfare cases and all but six do so in juvenile delinquen-
cy cases. Ten other states do not explicitly name an executive branch agen-
of Social Services staff to file child protection and delinquency petitions); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-7, 49-5-12 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 1st Extraordinary
Sess.) (allowing any person to file a delinquency petition and the prosecuting attorney
shall represent the petitioner); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1(a) (West, Westlaw
through the 2013 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (permitting the department or a "reputable
person" to file child protection petition); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(1) (West, Westlaw
through 2013 Wisc. Act 19) (permitting the district attorney, corporation counsel or
other designated official to file child protection petition); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
938.25(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Wisc. Act 19) (allowing the district attorney
or other executive branch official to file delinquency petitions); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
14-3-411 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Gen. Sess.) (requiring the district attor-
ney, with department of family services and county sheriff, to decide whether to file
child protection petition); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-211 (West, Westlaw through the
2013 Gen. Sess.) (mandating that the district attorney decide whether to file delin-
quency petitions); see also McCall v. District Court ex rel. Cnty. of Montezuma, 651
P.2d 392, 393-94 (Colo. 1982) (holding that only "the People through a state agency
may bring actions in neglect and dependency").
A small number of these states give courts some limited authority over the
decision whether to file a petition. For instance, individuals may seek judicial review
in California of a social worker's decision to not file a petition, and the court may
order the worker to file such a petition. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 331 (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 311 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. & the 2013-2014 1st Ex. Sess. laws).
Other states permit judicial branch officials or courts on their own motion to file peti-
tions. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.87 (West 2006); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 405/2-
13(1) (West 2007 & West Supp. 2013). Whatever separation of powers questions
might be raised by these provisions, it is not clear how often they are actually used,
and they still offer the executive branch prosecutorial discretion in most instances,
and does not make the judiciary the arbiter of which cases to file in all situations.
81. See sources cited supra note 80 and accompanying text. The six that do not
are Connecticut, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Utah.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-128(a) (West, Westlaw through Public Acts of the
2013 Jan. Reg. Sess. of the Conn. Gen. Assemb.); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 3-8A-03 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-7
(West, Westlaw through end of 1st Reg. Sess. of the 51st Legis.); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7B-1703 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2013-220 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the
Gen. Assemb.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-11(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 534
of the Reg. Sess.) (empowering juvenile intake officers to authorize petitions); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-602 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 1st Special Sess.) (requir-
ing the probation department and court to determine whether to act on a referral).
Several of those six states involve the executive branch to some degree in juvenile
charging decisions. Two of these states give executive branch attorneys some limited
authority to review prosecutorial discretion decisions. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-03(d); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1705 (West, Westlaw through
S.L. 2013-220 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). And at least one requires
the judiciary to "request" an executive branch attorney to file a delinquency petition.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-602(2)(c).
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cy or lawyer who can file juvenile court cases, but provide that any person
can file child protection cases without limiting the authority to file to judicial
branch officials; 82 several of these states also provide that executive branch
officials can file delinquency cases. Case law in these states suggests that
the executive branch often takes on the role of filing and prosecuting peti-
tions. Beyond Missouri, only two states, Alabama and Mississippi, have
statutes providing that only juvenile court officials may file both child protec-
tion and juvenile delinquency petitions.8 Concerns discussed in Parts III and
IV may similarly apply to cases in these states, or in any situation in which
82. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-841(A) (West, Westlaw through the 1st Reg.
Sess. and 1st Special Sess. of the 51st Legis.) ("any interested party" may file);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1003 (1999) (permitting any person to file child protection
or delinquency petition); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-38 (West, Westlaw through
the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (allowing any person to file delinquency or child protection
petitions); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.070(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Reg.
Sess.) (permitting any interested person to file child protection petition); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:7(I) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 279 of the 2013 Reg.
Sess.) (allowing any person to file child protection or delinquency petitions); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 & 26-38 of
the 130th Gen. Assemb.) (permitting any person to file a delinquency or child protec-
tion complaint); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.809 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 787
of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (allowing any person to file a child protection petition); 42
PENN. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6334 (West, Westlaw through Reg. Sess. Act 2013-72)
(allowing any person to file a child protection or delinquency petition); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-119 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 1st Reg. Sess.) (permitting any
person to file a child protection or delinquency petition); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
13.34.040(1) (West, Westlaw through Aug. 1, 2013) (allowing any person to file a
child protection petition).
83. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-301(2) (West, Westlaw through the Ist Reg.
Sess. and Ist Special Sess. of the 51st Legis.) (permitting county attorney to file de-
linquency petition); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419C.250 (West, Westlaw through Ch.
787 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (allowing the state through a district attorney to file de-
linquency petitions); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070(1) (West, Westlaw through Aug.
1, 2013) (requiring delinquency complaints to be referred to the prosecutor to deter-
mine whether to press charges). One of these states gives delinquency petitioning
authority to a "court-designated worker." See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.030 (West,
Westlaw through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
84. E.g., State v. Wilson, 545 A.2d 1178, 1183 (Del. 1988) (holding that the
attorney general's decision to file a delinquency petition may trigger the requirement
that the attorney general prosecute that petition).
85. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-120 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(requiring the juvenile court intake officer to file delinquency and child protec-
tion cases); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-451 (West, Westlaw through the 2013
Reg. Sess. & the 1st & 2d Ex. Sess.) (mandating that the youth court prosecutor or
another individual designated by the court shall draft and file delinquency and child
protection petitions).
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the judiciary takes on a particularly significant role in exercising prosecutorial
discretion in either juvenile delinquency or child welfare cases.
Missouri law grants the judicial branch more control over juvenile
petitions than even Alabama and Mississippi. Alabama case law describes
child protection petitions as those filed by the Department of Human
Resources and "endorsed by the juvenile-court intake officer,"86 terminology
suggesting executive branch control and a more ministerial role for juvenile
court intake officers. The Mississippi Supreme Court has approved delin-
quency petitions filed by a county attorney with the verbal approval of a ju-
venile court judge8 - a significant difference from Missouri's procedure of
juvenile officers through their lawyers, all employed within the judicial
branch and subject to judges' supervision, filing such petitions.88
Despite slight variations from state to state indicated in the above text
and footnotes, the bottom line may be stated succinctly: by giving juvenile
officers and their attorneys, both judicial branch employees hired and super-
vised by judges, the authority to determine what cases to file and how to file
them, Missouri has become an outlier within the United States. Missouri law
and practice concentrate more authority within the judicial branch than even
the other outlier states, Alabama and Mississippi.
1II. THE JUVENILE OFFICER'S PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS
The juvenile officer's prosecutorial discretion is not merely "unusual," 89
it also violates the Missouri Constitution's separation of powers clauses. The
effects of those clauses, and their federal analogs, are evident in the familiar
division of powers cases filed by the state to limit an individual's rights, such
as criminal prosecutions or civil cases to enforce a regulatory regime. A state
legislature defines what conduct is permissible and impermissible - delineat-
ing, for instance, what conduct by adults would constitute a crime or what
conduct by juveniles would constitute a delinquent act. Executive branch
agencies investigate alleged breaches of these statutes and decide whether to
file court cases alleging violations and seeking specified remedies. In adult
criminal cases and juvenile delinquency cases in the vast majority of states,
an executive branch attorney files a pleading alleging that the adult criminal
defendant (or the juvenile respondent) committed acts that fall within legisla-
tively-defined prohibited conduct. These allegations are then adjudicated
within the judicial branch - a judge (in most juvenile delinquency cases) or
86. G.H. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 62 So.3d 540, 544 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2010) (emphasis added).
87. See In re Evans, 350 So. 2d 52, 54 (Miss. 1977).
88. See supra Part II.A.
89. In re M.C., 504 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo. App. E.D. 1974).
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jury (in most adult criminal cases) rules whether the executive branch has met
its burden of proof that the individual committed the acts alleged.
Separating executive, judicial, and legislative powers in this manner has
a venerable history that traces to the nation's founders and to enlightenment
thinkers who inspired them. James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 47,
"judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from
the executive stock."90  Quoting Montesquieu, Madison explained that
"[w]ere the power of judging ... joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."9' The founders estab-
lished a tripartite system of government "to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other."92 Inter-
preting the Constitution that Madison helped write and explain, the Supreme
Court of the United States has consistently held that executive power includes
prosecutorial discretion - the discretion to determine whether to initiate a
court case to enforce a statute and what claims to make and relief to seek in
such cases are the quintessential means of executing the law. 93
The Missouri Constitution establishes a similar tripartite system with, if
anything, stronger provisions separating one branch of government from an-
other.94 Although the Supreme Court of Missouri has not expounded on the
topic as extensively as the Supreme Court of the United States, the state con-
stitutional text and constitutional case law lead to an analogous conclusion -
prosecutorial discretion resides with the executive branch. The juvenile
officer's role therefore violates the Missouri Constitution. This section will
explain that conclusion, first by reviewing federal constitutional case law
holding that prosecutorial discretion resides squarely in the executive branch.
This section then argues that analyzing the Missouri Constitution leads to the
same conclusion.
A. Federal Separation of Powers
As a matter of federal constitutional law, prosecutorial discretion be-
longs to the executive branch. The U.S. Constitution vests the "executive
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). Madison was responding to criti-
cism that the Constitution eroded separation of powers by giving the President author-
ity to nominate judges or to make judges "shoots from the executive stock." Id.
91. Id. (emphasis in original). Madison's language illustrates how separating
powers can prevent "oppress[ion]," or the infringement of individual liberties by state
authorities. Id. In modem times, one could frame the issue in due process terms -
that adequate checks between branches of government are necessary to avoid unlaw-
ful invasions of constitutionally-protected liberties, such as the family integrity or
juvenile liberty rights at stake in juvenile court. See, e.g., infra note 206 and accom-
panying text.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
93. See infra Part IllI.A.
94. See infra Part III.B. 1.
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Power" in the President and directs the President to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed."9 The Supreme Court of the United States has re-
peatedly held that the federal executive power includes the power to choose
whether to file a court case to enforce the law, what to allege in any such
court case, and how to prosecute such a case. For instance, in Buckley v.
Valeo, the Court wrote, "A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the
law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution
entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully execut-
ed."' 9 6 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court described the decision whether "to
institute proceedings" as "a decision which has long been regarded as the
special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive
who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' 9 7 This principle is well established with an extensive citation
list. 98 The only exceptions to this rule involve unique situations, such as the
appointment of independent prosecutors to investigate executive branch offi-
cials, when no other branch of government has supervisory authority over the
prosecutor.99 No such unique situation applies to the juvenile court.
The Supreme Court applies these rules to both civil enforcement actions
filed by the government and criminal prosecutions. Heckler explained that
federal agencies have "absolute discretion" to decide whether to file a legal
action to enforce the law "whether through civil or criminal process."10 Sim-
ilarly, Buckley applied the strong language quoted above to a civil enforce-
ment action by the Federal Election Commission.10 1 Indeed, Buckley held
unconstitutional a statute granting a Congressionally-appointed body authori-
ty to institute civil actions to enforce a civil regulatory scheme because such
enforcement authority belongs solely to the executive branch.102
95. U.S. CONsT. art. 11, §§ 1, 3.
96. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (quoting article II, section 3 of the
Constitution).
97. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (quoting article II, section 3 of
the Constitution).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (determining
when and how to enforce federal criminal laws is a "special province" of executive
authority with great "latitude") (citations omitted); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to pros-
ecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in
his discretion."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("[T]he Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute
a case.").
99. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Even these circumstances
triggered a compelling dissent explaining which prosecutorial discretion "is a quintes-
sentially executive function." Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. 470 U.S. at 831.
101. 424 U.S. at 112-13.
102. Id. at 113.
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The Supreme Court's application of separation of powers principles to
civil cases is important because child protection cases are civil in nature.10 3
Even juvenile delinquency cases are denominated as civil cases, although the
Supreme Court has deemed them criminal proceedings for certain purposes
and criticized "the feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience.',0
Following Buckley and Heckler, one need not determine if juvenile court
proceedings are civil or criminal; in either category, the separation of powers
concern is the same. Moreover, the Court explained in Heckler that there are
particularly strong reasons to respect an administrative agency's prosecutorial
discretion when litigation is one tool in a complicated civil regulatory system:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicat-
ed balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within
its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a
violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best
spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely
to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action
requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed,
whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the ac-
tion at all. o
All of these factors apply to child abuse and neglect proceedings.106 The
executive branch child protection agency investigates allegations of child
abuse and neglect and determines whether such allegations are true, considers
the strength of the evidence in individual cases, and assesses how harmful
such abuse or neglect is.107 The child protection agency can consider both the
resources necessary to prosecute a juvenile court case and the resources nec-
essary to handle the results of such a case - including the availability of foster
homes, personnel to manage foster care cases, and services provided to foster
children and their families. In light of all of these factors, the agency then has
all the information necessary to determine whether filing legal action in this
particular case would serve the agency's overall goals and whether it would
effectively apply the agency's limited resources - or whether some alternative
to filing a juvenile court case would be better.
103. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.271.1 (2000 & Supp. 2012) (providing that no
juvenile court adjudication amounts to a conviction).
104. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
105. 470 U.S. at 831.
106. Absent a juvenile delinquency agency analogous to the Children's Division,
this same argument does not apply to juvenile delinquency cases.
107. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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B. Missouri Constitutional Text and Case Law
Federal case law is more explicit on the subject of prosecutorial discre-
tion and separation of powers than Missouri case law, and the Supreme Court
of Missouri has not explicitly ruled on the question of whether a civil child
abuse or neglect case or juvenile delinquency case may be filed and prosecut-
ed by a member of the judicial branch. Nonetheless, an analysis of Supreme
Court of Missouri decisions and the Missouri Constitution's text and history
shows that the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court of the United States
should apply to Missouri law.
1. Missouri Case Law Leads
to the Same Conclusion as Federal Law
Missouri case law exploring both the executive and judicial powers
shows that the former includes and the latter excludes the power to determine
which cases and which charges to file and prosecute. Missouri courts
have already endorsed the executive branch's authority to exercise prosecuto-
rial discretion in the criminal context, explaining that a "prosecutor has broad
discretion on the decision to prosecute and this decision is seldom subject to
judicial review."' 08  Although this quotation is from a criminal context,
the Supreme Court of Missouri has held more generally that "the power to
administer and enforce the law lies solely with the executive branch."109
Moreover, as Heckler and Buckley demonstrate for the federal Constitution,
the same rule applies to civil prosecutions. That is especially true given that
the Supreme Court of the United States relied on language - the Take
Care Clause - that appears in substantively identical form in the Missouri
Constitution. 11oAs Buckley and Heckler explain, executive power to enforce
the law includes the power to determine whether filing a court action is justi-
fied and effective."'
The Supreme Court of Missouri has issued several decisions elucidating
the judicial power granted to the circuit courts (of which juvenile courts are a
part' 12) by the Missouri Constitution.' 13 These decisions gave no hint that the
108. State v. Massey, 763 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988). Massey ad-
dressed the narrow grounds for judicial review of vindictively-filed charges. Id; see
also State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. 1999) ("A prosecutor has broad discre-
tion whether to prosecute - a decision seldom subject to judicial review.").
109. State Auditor v. Joint Comm. on Legislative Research, 956 S.W.2d 228, 231
(Mo. 1997) (citing Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
110. See infra Part III.B.2.
111. See supra Part Ill.A.
112. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.021.1(3) (2000).
113. See MO. CONST. art V, § 1 ("The judicial power of the state shall be vested in
a supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of districts as prescribed by law, and
circuit courts.").
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judicial power includes deciding whether to file child abuse or neglect peti-
tions, determining what to allege against a parent or a juvenile, or prosecuting
such petitions. Rather, the court espoused the standard view that the judici-
ary's power is to determine factual and legal issues brought before it in cases
filed by private parties or the executive branch. The constitution grants the
judiciary two "exclusive" powers: "judicial review and the power of courts to
decide issues and pronounce and enforce judgments."I14
Finally, the Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized that the purpose
of separating powers is "to prevent the concentration of unchecked power
in the hands of one branch of government."" It should be evident that under
present law and practice, the judiciary holds power unchecked by another
branch. Subordinate judicial branch officials (juvenile officers) determine
which juvenile court cases to file, decide what charges to bring and
against whom, and prosecute such charges." Then superior judicial branch
officials (judges) adjudicate the factual and legal issues raised in the case." 7
That is, the judicial branch files and prosecutes petitions in front of itself.
In light of the federal and state authorities discussed in this section, it is ines-
capable that this status quo violates the Missouri Constitution's separation of
powers provisions.
2. The Missouri Constitution's Text and History Reveal That the
Judiciary Branch Cannot Constitutionally File and Prosecute Cases
To the extent the above Missouri case law leaves any ambiguity, the
Missouri Constitution resolves the question similarly. The Missouri Constitu-
tion includes language that parallels the U.S. Constitution's assignment of
prosecutorial discretion to the executive branch; if anything, Missouri's con-
stitution includes stronger language. Further, the history of the Missouri
Constitution suggests that its separation of powers protections are at least as
strong as their federal analogs. Two provisions are particularly important.
First, Article II establishes three distinct branches of government. 118 It
creates no "impenetrable wall of separation," but it does "proscribe the exer-
cise of powers or duties constitutionally assigned to one department by either
114. Chastain v. Chastain, 932 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Mo. 1996); see also Percy
Kent Bag Co. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 632 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Mo. 1982)
("true judicial power vested in the courts by our constitution is the power to decide
and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
115. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also
Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465, 467-68 (Mo. 1910) (citing the Founders and an early
New Hampshire opinion explaining the overarching purpose of the separation of
powers doctrine).
116. See supra notes 5 7-59 and accompanying text.
117. See supra Part II.A.
118. See MO. CONST. art II, § 1.
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of the other two,"ll 9 using language suggesting relatively tight boundaries
between those branches:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments - the legislative, executive and judicial - each of
which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no per-
son, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of pow-
ers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exer-
cise any power properly belonging to either of the others, ex-
cept in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted. 120
Second, Missouri's constitution includes a "take care" clause that is
nearly identical to the federal Constitution's take care clause cited repeatedly
by the Supreme Court of the United States as assigning prosecutorial deci-
sions to the executive branch. 121 Article IV of the Missouri Constitution pro-
vides that "[t]he governor shall take care that the laws are distributed and
faithfully executed... ."122
The text of these two provisions leads to the conclusion that Missouri
separates powers similarly to the federal government and, if any differences
exist, that the Missouri provisions separate powers more strictly. Crucially,
the framers of Missouri's constitution added strong separation of powers lan-
guage absent from the federal Constitution. Article II of the Missouri Consti-
tution prohibits one branch of government from exercising power assigned to
another "except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted."l 23 Missouri's constitution, like most state constitutions, is far
more detailed than the federal Constitution, and it does contain several explic-
it textual exceptions on which the Supreme Court of Missouri has relied. 124
When a particular statutory scheme does not satisfy the provisions of such
textual exceptions, then the Supreme Court of Missouri has found a separa-
tion of powers violation.125 No explicit constitutional provision exists that
would permit the judiciary to exercise executive branch authority in juvenile
119. Chastain, 932 S.W.2d at 398.
120. MO. CONST. art II, § 1.
121. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
122. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
123. MO. CONST. art 11, § 1.
124. See, e.g., Percy Kent Bag Co. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 632
S.W.3d 480, 484 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (relying on article V, section 18 of the Mis-
souri Constitution to uphold an administrative agency's authority to issue case-
specific findings).
125. See, e.g., Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
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matters. Moreover, Missouri's take care clause includes the same language
as the federal take care clause, adding only the term "distributed."l 26
History also suggests that the Missouri Constitution's separation of
powers clauses were intended to be at least as strong as their federal counter-
parts.127 Missouri's separation of powers and "take care" clauses date to Mis-
souri's original 1820 constitution; that language was not changed substantive-
ly by subsequent constitutional revisions.128 The 1820 constitutional conven-
tion's records are silent regarding these two provisions.129 That silence con-
tinued through the convention that drafted Missouri's current constitution,
adopted in 1945.130 The nearly identical language of the take care clause, the
126. Compare MO. CONST. art. IV, § 2, with U.S. CONsT. art II, § 3. It is not clear
what difference Missouri's constitutional framers intended with that added term - or
even if any difference was intended. Textually, the term does not appear to add any
substantive considerations to the argument that the take care clause places prosecuto-
rial discretion within the executive branch. The Supreme Court of Missouri has quot-
ed the phrase, but not offered any explanation as to what the term "distributed" might
mean. See, e.g., Kinder v. Holden, 92 S.W.3d 793, 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (quot-
ing the take care clause). Without any textual or historical clues to the contrary, we
ought not place weight on this small difference. See Hans A. Linde, State Constitu-
tions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Garner's Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 927, 935 (1993) ("Without evidence that distinct wording was deliberately cho-
sen for a known purpose, identical or different working is immaterial to independent
state interpretation."). For the same reasons, the textual similarities alone do not
require Missouri courts to interpret the state constitution as the Supreme Court of the
United States has interpreted the federal one, at least as a matter of state constitutional
theory. See id. (arguing for the possibility of independent interpretation of state con-
stitutional clauses that parallel federal clauses); Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional
Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a
Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 34-35 (1989) (same).
127. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465, 467 (Mo. 1910) (referencing the
common goals of the separation of powers clauses in both the Missouri and federal
Constitutions).
128. Compare MO. CONST. art. 11 (1820) ("of the distribution of powers"), and
Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (1820) ("take care" clause), with Mo. CONST. art. 11, § 1, and
Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
129. For instance, the journal of the convention records that draft language "em-
bracing the distribution of power and legislative department" was discussed on June
30, 1820. MO. J. OF STATE CONVENTION 15 (1820). The journal then notes discus-
sions regarding the legislative power, but nothing regarding the "distribution of pow-
ers" clause. Id. at 15-19. The journal notes that the convention "took up" this clause
on one other date but records no substantive discussion other than the fact that it was
agreed to. Id. at 33. Similarly, the executive branch powers - including the take care
clause - were discussed without specific reference to the take care clause (section 8)
other than to note that it was agreed to. Id. at 20-22, 38-39.
130. Debates of the 1943-1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri, 1932 (re-
porting the reading and adoption of Article II without objection or discussion, other
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stronger language of the separation of powers clause, the historical commit-
ment to separation of powers, and the absence of contrary historical evidence
creates a strong circumstantial case that Missouri's separation of powers
clauses impose the same or stronger divisions between the three branches of
government as the federal Constitution does.
Two other factors suggest that Missouri's separation of powers clauses,
like their federal counterparts, require the executive branch and not juvenile
officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion. The first is that Missouri's sepa-
ration of powers clauses should be understood in the "discursive context" in
which they were framedl31 - a national polity with a commitment to separa-
tion of powers so strong that framers of the federal Constitution felt com-
pelled to explain how strongly that constitution protected the separation of
powers principle. James Madison framed his exposition of the separation of
powers in Federalist No. 47 as a defense of the Constitution's robust en-
forcement of the separation of powers.132 That essay thus illustrates how both
proponents and opponents of the U.S. Constitution - adopted just one genera-
tion prior to the Missouri Constitution - shared a commitment to the separa-
tion of powers.
The second factor is precedential. The Supreme Court of Missouri has
repeatedly relied upon federal separation of powers authorities in elucidating
the Missouri Constitution's separation of powers clauses.133 The court should
than noting that it was identical to the then-existing Constitution), 3980 (reporting the
reading and adoption of Article IV section 2 without any discussion or objection).
131. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (1993).
132. Madison began Federalist No. 47 by summarizing an argument made by the
U.S. Constitution's opponents: "One of the principal objections inculcated by the
more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the polit-
ical maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be
separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said,
seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty." THE
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). Madison's rebuttal is not to diminish the im-
portance of the separation of powers, but to explain how the U.S. Constitution does,
in fact, separate powers effectively.
133. See, e.g., State Auditor v. Joint Comm. on Legislative Research, 956 S.W.2d
228, 231 (Mo. 1997) (quoting and applying INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring)); Mo. Coal. for the Env't v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules,
948 S.W.2d 125, 134 (Mo. 1997) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34
(1986)) (regarding the extent of legislative powers); State v. Massey, 763 S.W.2d 181,
183 (Mo. 1988) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1982) and United
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1982)) (regarding prosecutorial discretion);
State v. Watts, 601 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. 1980) (citing United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 123-25 (1979) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974))
(regarding the executive branch prosecutor's authority to choose on which of several
possible statutory provisions to base charges).
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similarly rely on Supreme Court of the United States decisions recognizing
prosecutorial discretion as a fundamental executive branch power.
IV. WHY WE SHOULD CARE
The separation of powers problem in Missouri's existing juvenile court
structure has existed for decades and has been noted by judges,' 34 the Mis-
souri Bar,135 the National Juvenile Defender Center, and the ABA. The
existing structure may persist because of a perceived aversion to change or
because it is hard to see the harms from violating the abstract separation of
powers principle.
This section will identify some of the various harms that can flow from
the existing system, especially in child abuse and neglect cases. First, the
juvenile officer's role ignores key elements of modem juvenile law. In child
welfare cases, it ignores the existence of an executive branch agency charged
with managing a comprehensive child welfare system. In juvenile delinquen-
cy cases, it ignores the core principle that, even with the law's therapeutic
goals, juveniles have a right to be adjudicated in a system that follows consti-
tutional principles. Second, the juvenile officer's role exacerbates structural
problems within family courts nationwide, leading to overly cozy relation-
ships that weaken decision making quality, limit judges' ability to stop un-
necessary litigation, and reduce litigants' sense of procedural justice. Third,
by granting juvenile officers authority to decide which cases are filed in juve-
nile court, the existing system places too much power in the hands of judges.
Fourth, in child welfare cases, disempowering the executive branch limits the
ability of the Children's Division to fulfill its statutory mandates as effective-
ly as possible and to lead a highly functioning child welfare system. Finally,
134. See infra note 214 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Darrell Missey).
135. The Bar's Juvenile Law deskbook identifies "potential conflicts" that flow
from the absence ofjuvenile officers' independence from judges. Mo. Juvenile Law §
1.14 (MoBar 4th ed. 2011).
136. "The structure of Missouri's juvenile court, by its very nature, creates con-
flicting roles. The role of the deputy juvenile officer (Missouri's equivalent of proba-
tion officer) and legal officer (Missouri's equivalent of prosecutor), as designed and
implemented, presents challenges to the judiciary regarding the fair implementation of
due process, supervision, and the requirement of impartiality." MARY ANN SCALI ET
AL., NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MISSOURI: JUSTICE RATIONED, AN ASSESSMENT
OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF JUVENILE DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 7 (2013), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Mis-
souriAssessement.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
137. See STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 17
("[C]onstitutional issues still remain when intake decisions are made by employees
selected by a judge to carry out his or her policies.").
138. The Missouri Bar's juvenile law hornbook, for instance, asserts without cita-
tion that placing prosecutorial discretion in the executive branch "is highly unlikely."
Mo. Juvenile Law § 1.14 (MoBar 4th ed. 2011).
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in child welfare cases, the existing structure wastes public resources on staff
whose powers and obligations should be subsumed - at no cost - by the ex-
ecutive branch agency.
A. The Juvenile Officer's Role Is an Anachronism
The juvenile officer's role is anachronistic - and thus an outlier across
the country - because it rests on two ideas that have changed dramatically
since the juvenile court's origins. First, Missouri law ignores the executive
branch agency that has existed for a generation and that could logically exer-
cise prosecutorial discretion, at least in child welfare cases. The juvenile
court and the juvenile officer predate the modem administrative state; the first
juvenile court was created in 1899 in Chicago.' 39 The juvenile court became
the focal point for society's growing awareness of the need to protect children
from abuse, in part because no executive branch agency could administer
child protection programs1 40 and very few services for children existed be-
yond the courts.14 1 The Missouri General Assembly created a juvenile court
in St. Louis in 1903, before the Children's Division existed, and adopted
nearly identical legislation to that which created the Chicago juvenile
court.142 The legislation empowered probation officers (whose titles were
later changed to juvenile officers) to investigate, file, and prosecute juvenile
court cases.143 At the time of the juvenile court's creation, the only altema-
tives to a juvenile court official filing and prosecuting cases were criminal
prosecutors - seen as overly punitive - or private entities, like children's aid
societies, filing cases.'"
The modem administrative state - complete with various executive
branch agencies with authority to enforce laws through their own lawsuits -
developed decades later, especially during the New Deal era in the 1930s. 145
139. See COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE ET AL., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE
157 (2001).
140. DOUGLAS ABRAMS, A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN LIFE: A HISTORY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE IN MISSOURI 44-45 (2003) ("The court's overt social welfare role won wide
support because the state had begun creating child protective programs, but without a
network of executive agencies to administer them.").
141. STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS, supra note 78, at 43.
142. See id. at 45-47.
143. See Noah Weinstein, The Juvenile Court Concept in Missouri: Its Historical
Development - the Need for New Legislation, 1957 WASH. U. L.Q. 17, 24-29 (1957).
144. Id. at 38 (describing how any resident or circuit prosecutor could file a juve-
nile petition in the early years of the juvenile court); see also id. at 20 (describing the
power of private "societies" in the 1800s to file petitions seeking custody of children
based on allegations of neglect).
145. See Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theo-
ry and Operation ofIndependent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1116-17
(2000).
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During that era, Congress enacted the Social Security Act, which included
provisions for federal funding to state welfare agencies.146 Missouri needed
an executive branch agency to access these federal funds, so the state created
a Social Security Commission to administer welfare benefits to needy
children and families.147 The modem child welfare administrative state did
not come of age until decades later; Congress enacted a series of federal fund-
ing statutes in the 1970s that established criteria for state child welfare agen-
cies to tap federal funds. 14 In 1974, the Missouri General Assembly created
the Division of Family Services (subsequently renamed the Children's
Division 49) within the Department of Social Services to operate a compre-
hensive child welfare system and to access the widening stream of federal
child welfare funds. 50 The juvenile officers' role in Missouri began in 1903,
before the New Deal and the modern administrative state,' 5 i and was
strengthened through 1957 legislation that gave juvenile officers exclusive
authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion;152 both steps came decades
before establishment of the modem child welfare administrative structure.
The Missouri General Assembly has not adjusted the juvenile officers' role
at all to accommodate the creation of the Children's Division and its prede-
cessor agencies.
The second anachronism in Missouri's juvenile court structure is the no-
tion that the juvenile court's inherently therapeutic purpose renders formal
protections for individual rights, such as the separation of powers, unneces-
sary. The creators of the Missouri juvenile courts thought that the same indi-
vidual who chose to file a delinquency or child abuse case could represent the
child or family whenever they lacked their own lawyer.153 As Judge Noah
Weinstein, a prominent Missouri juvenile court judge, wrote in 1957, the
juvenile court had two core animating ideas - first, that therapeutic and reha-
bilitative goals were most appropriate for juvenile offenders, and second, that
these goals rendered constitutional protections unnecessary.154 That same
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
147. ABRAMS, supra note 140, at 138.
148. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-679c (2006 & Supp. 2011). Notably, the con-
ventional wisdom that juvenile court prosecutorial discretion should reside with
executive branch agencies was published in this era. See supra notes 76-79 and
accompanying text.
149. See H.B. 1453, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004) (separating
the Division of Family Services into the Family Support Division and the Child-
ren's Division).
150. ABRAMS, supra note 140, at 139.
151. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
153. ABRAMS, supra note 140, at 76.
154. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 33.
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year, and at Judge Weinstein's urging, the General Assembly amended the
juvenile code to limit the ability to file a delinquency or abuse or neglect peti-
tion to the juvenile officer, thereby preventing an administrative agency, rep-
resented by an executive branch attorney, from doing so.'56 The legislation
justified granting more power to juvenile officers because doing so would
reduce the stigma of being charged with a delinquent act and being commit-
ted to a juvenile detention facility.157
In granting the juvenile officer the crucial and exclusive power of
prosecutorial discretion, the General Assembly did not anticipate the applica-
tion of core due process protections to juvenile court proceedings. In
the juvenile delinquency context, the Supreme Court of the United States'
1967 decision In re Gault repudiated the notion that rehabilitation trumps
rights in juvenile court and insisted that juvenile courts be "constitutional[ly]
domesticat[ed]." 58  In the child abuse and neglect context, the General
Assembly did not anticipate the widespread recognition that any child
abuse and neglect case imposes an enormous stigma on both parents and
children involved in such cases, regardless of who files child abuse and
neglect allegations.159 The General Assembly also failed to anticipate the
various Supreme Court decisions that applied due process protections to
respect the right to family integrity at stake in child abuse and neglect
155. Abrams identifies the judge, Noah Weinstein, as one of four "primary draft-
ers" of the act. ABRAMS, supra note 140 at 146.
156. See State v. Taylor, 323 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. App. Springfield D. 1959); Wein-
stein, supra note 143, at 38.
157. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 38. The legislation included a number of pro-
visions designed to provide effective services to juvenile offenders. ABRAMS, supra
note 140, at 147-49. For purposes of this Article, however, I focus on the legislation's
decision to grant exclusive prosecutorial discretion to juvenile officers.
158. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967). The legislature also failed to anticipate
the powerful critique which animated the Supreme Court's ruling - that in juvenile
court "there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 556 (1966).
159. Child protection system involvement is enormously stigmatizing - especially
to parents, and especially the poor, black mothers disproportionately labeled as bad
parents through the child protection system. See Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers, " "Good
Lawyers, " and "Legal Ethics", 81 GEO. L.J. 2533, 2547 (1993) (describing the "gen-
dered focus of child dependency law" as imposing a "stigma of 'badness"' on wom-
en); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 28
(2002). And that stigma can pass down a generation to children. See, e.g., ALEX
HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 21 (1999) (describing
stigma of being a "state child"). Dorothy Roberts has described how the view of legal
institutions and society towards many black women as "degenera[te] stigmatizes not
only mothers but their children as well." DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK
BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 21 (1997).
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casesl16 - protections that would be unnecessary in a purely informal model.
Following these decisions, juvenile courts could still order children and fami-
lies to receive rehabilitative services instead of only punishment, but they had
to recognize that such orders infringed on fundamental constitutional rights
that require proper procedures - including procedures that respect the consti-
tutionally-mandated separation of powers.
Courts have grappled with how to comport Missouri's system with
Gault. One appellate decision regarding juvenile officers, issued five years
after Gault, demonstrates the difficult place that the purely therapeutic vision
of the juvenile court holds now that the Supreme Court of the United States
requires formal due process protections for youth. In re F. C. involved a ju-
venile who was adjudicated delinquent and committed to the State Training
School for Boys - a juvenile detention center - and who challenged his adju-
dication because the same individual served as both juvenile officer and
county prosecuting attorney. The court ruled in the juvenile's favor, de-
scribing the juvenile officer's role consistent with the pre-Gault therapeutic
mindset: "The juvenile officer is seen there not as an adversary but in an atti-
tude of helpfulness . . . . [T]he Juvenile Act contemplate[s] a relationship of
trust and confidence between the child and juvenile officer as the first indis-
pensible step to rehabilitation."l62 In contrast, a prosecuting attorney seeks to
prosecute individuals for crimes.1 63 The court held that the two roles are in-
compatible because a juvenile officer cannot create a parens patriae relation-
ship with a juvenile if he is also a prosecutor!1 6 If that were so, then the ju-
venile would have to be warned "that the juvenile officer also may have the
duty to prosecute him, and is a potential adversary."l 65
The In re F. C. court neglected to add that, in fact, the juvenile officer
does have the duty to prosecute juveniles and is a potential adversary; it is the
juvenile officer, after all, who asks his attorney to file a petition and, through
that attorney, presents evidence to support that petition. The federal govern-
160. See, e.g., Santoksy v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (requiring proof
by clear and convincing evidence before a state may terminate parental rights); Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (requiring states to provide parents with
hearings on their fitness before removing children).
161. 484 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Mo. App. W.D. 1972). The case originated in Pulaski
County, a rural county that straddles Interstate 44 between St. Louis and Springfield.
Id. Presumably, the same individual served as prosecuting attorney and juvenile of-
ficer for efficiency purposes in a low population area. This case did not raise a sepa-
ration of powers challenge to a judicial branch officer exercising prosecutorial discre-
tion and only challenged the merger of a juvenile officer and his lawyer. Id.
162. Id. at 25. Indeed, one lawyer for juvenile officers has described the juvenile
officer role as "basically a pre-Gault role." SCALI ET AL., supra note 136, at 37.
163. F.C., 484 S.W.2d at 25.
164. Id. at 26.
165. Id.
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ment recognized this role as adversarial more than a decade before Gault. 166
These acts threaten to trigger juvenile court authority to detain a juvenile or
issue other orders that significantly invade the juvenile's liberty. After Gault,
it is impossible to see how a court could find anything different. In re F. C.
did not address this issue, other than through a coy "Cf." cite to Gault.16 7 As
the court's citation suggests, there is no intellectually coherent way to consid-
er the individual who chooses to file petitions alleging a juvenile committed a
delinquent act as anything other than an adversary. Similarly, in child wel-
fare cases, the individual who chooses to file a petition seeking to remove a
child from the child's parents, and thus invade the parents' and the child's
fundamental constitutional rights to family integrity, must be viewed as an
adversary to the parents and, in certain cases, to the child.
A later court decision recognized the juvenile officer's uneasy post-
Gault status. Applying Gault, In re MC held that a juvenile officer must
warn a juvenile about his right to avoid self-incrimination before interviewing
the child.168 This language contradicted In re F.C., which suggested that
advising juveniles of their privilege against self-incrimination would "ad-
vance to the very earliest stage of the juvenile process the need for constitu-
tional due process" contrary to the juvenile court's therapeutic goal.16 The
decision in In re MC. thus rejected the court's view in In re F.C. that the
juvenile officer's therapeutic role could, after Gault, take precedence over
juveniles' due process rights. In re MC. illustrates how Missouri courts be-
gan following the letter of the Supreme Court of the United States' decision.
But it did not explain how the law should balance the juvenile officer's alleg-
edly therapeutic role in light of the legal recognition that filing a petition to
invade a juvenile's or a parent's fundamental liberty interest is inherently
adversarial. Nor, in the nearly forty years since In re MC, have the Missouri
General Assembly or courts directly addressed that issue.
In re Gault's repudiation of the idea that therapeutic goals could render
juveniles' constitutional rights unimportant did not suggest that the therapeu-
166. See STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS, supra note 78, at 42 (describing
how filing and prosecuting a petition often places court staff "in an adversary position
in the eyes of the child and family").
167. 484 S.W.2d at 26. Doug Abrams has written in another context that "Gault
did not produce change overnight." ABRAMS, supra note 140, at 156. The In re F. C.
"cf." cite illustrates the point. The Bluebook describes "Cf" as appropriate for au-
thority that "supports a proposition different from the main proposition but sufficient-
ly analogous to lend support." THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R.
1.2(a), at 55 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). To make the
cited authority's relevance clear, the Bluebook "strongly recommend[s]" parenthetical
explanations. Id. In re F.C. offers no explanation, parenthetical or otherwise, for
how Gault supported its proposition that due process protections are inappropriate
early in a case.
168. 504 S.W.2d 641, 647 (Mo. App. E.D. 1972).
169. In re F.C., 484 S.W.2d at 26.
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tic aims of juvenile delinquency law - the idea that the state should seek to
rehabilitate and not merely punish juvenile offenders - are invalid, nor did the
decision convey that such goals should not guide prosecutorial discretion.
That element of Missouri's statute remains well-supported. The element that
lacks support is the suggestion, dating to the juvenile court's origins and con-
tinuing through the 1957 statutory reforms, that these therapeutic goals can
render unnecessary the legal rules that protect individuals from unwarranted
state invasion of rights.170 How to respect those rules while achieving those
therapeutic aims is a topic deserving careful legislative attention.17'
B. Violating Separation of Powers Is Particularly
Harmful in Juvenile Court
Placing juvenile officers in the judiciary and rendering them subject to
judges' supervisory control is particularly harmful in the juvenile court con-
text. The high stakes in juvenile court cases - whether the state legally severs
family relationships and whether children are placed in detention or other
forms of state custody - make it incumbent upon juvenile courts to reach fair
and accurate decisions. Yet, in child welfare cases especially, commentators
have roundly criticized juvenile courts around the nation for practicing
"groupthink,"l 72 making decisions based on cognitive short cuts (also known
as heuristics), 73 and exerting coercive authority in a therapeutic guise to
pressure parties - especially mothers - to go along with state-created plans to
break up families pending parental rehabilitation.' 74 In these critiques, juve-
nile courts are places where cozy in-groups of repeat players - the judges,
lawyers, and case workers who routinely practice in juvenile court - subtly
and often unintentionally create an institutional culture. That culture dis-
suades individuals from challenging decisions and further disempowers the
disproportionately poor, minority, and female-headed families subject to ju-
170. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, supra note 79,
at 4-5 (describing how juvenile and family courts evolved from initially failing
to recognize their actions as limiting individual freedom to adopting procedures
designed to protect individual rights against unwarranted state intrusion). The fed-
eral Children's Bureau also concluded that the juvenile court's goal of "individualized
justice [for children and families] is not hampered but rather strengthened by being
placed within the traditional framework of American constitutional rights and judicial
practice." Id. at 8.
171. See infra Part V.A (discussing legislative possibilities).
172. Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the
Institutional Culture ofFamily Courts Through the Lens ofSocial Psychology Group-
think Theory, 34 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 55, 61-62 (2010).
173. See Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics,
Cognitive Biases, andAccountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 938-39 (2013).
174. See Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate? ": A Critique of Informality
in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 343-44 (1999).
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venile court child abuse and neglect jurisdiction. These features lead to nega-
tive outcomes in multiple ways: courts reach inaccurate decisions because
these features hide disputed factual issues,175 the features trigger reliance on
mental short cuts,"7 and they create an institutional culture in which multiple
players avoid challenging what the culture teaches them to expect.177 These
elements erode courts' abilities to give all parties a voice in judicial process-
es; a voice that social scientists have found to be essential to developing a
sense of procedural justice among litigants.178
The foregoing critiques apply to juvenile and family courts nationwide,
but the juvenile officer's role in the Missouri system exacerbates these core
problems in at least four ways. First, Missouri's juvenile court structure takes
a step towards an inquisitorial model in which a judicial branch employee
determines which cases to prosecute and how. Social scientists have found
an inquisitorial system less preferable to litigants than an adversarial system,
largely because litigants feel they have a greater voice in an adversarial sys-
tem.179 When litigants - children, who are by virtue of their age generally
considered legally disabled, and their disproportionately poor and minority
parents, who generally lack power due to their low socioeconomic status -
see a judicial branch employee arguing to their supervisor, the judge, that the
parent neglected the child or that the child committed a delinquent act and
must be removed from his parent and placed in state custody, it is not hard to
imagine why they might feel their voice is not heard quite as clearly. Liti-
gants may even question the judge's neutrality when the judge is asked to
adjudicate a petition filed by a member of the judge's own team. In child
welfare cases, litigants' voices are further diminished by adding another indi-
vidual to speak with the voice of state authority: the Children's Division
worker. In other states, the child welfare agency prosecutes child protection
petitions.is' In Missouri, child protection cases have two officials - the Chil-
dren's Division worker and the juvenile officer - typically arguing for state
invasions of family integrity.182 A litigant's voice, or the litigant's perception
of having a sufficiently strong voice, is further diminished by the first among
equals role that juvenile officers take in hearings; by introducing all the par-
175. See id. at 340.
176. See Fraidin, supra note 173, at 935.
177. See Breger, supra note 172, at 56.
178. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in
the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 152 (2011) (citing JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 121 (1975)).
179. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 178, at 118; Hollander-Blumoff, supra
note 178, at 152; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 163 (2006)
(describing the importance of litigants' voice in creating procedural justice).
180. Belief in ajudge's neutrality is an essential element of procedural justice, and
in litigants' perceptions of fairness. See TYLER, supra note 179, at 163-64.
181. See supra Part ll.B.
182. See supra Part I.A.
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ties and presenting all parties' reports to the judge, the juvenile officers act
out the families' relative lack of power and voice in the proceeding.
Missouri law also exacerbates a second core problem: the juvenile of-
ficer's role within the judicial branch increases the cohesion of the decision-
making group. One pillar of juvenile court critiques is that the professionals
who staff juvenile courts create a cohesive decision-making group in which
repeat players become unlikely to challenge dominant thinking and the insti-
tution makes decisions through group think.184 In juvenile courts outside of
Missouri, this concern is partly balanced by some of the repeat players' pro-
fessional duty to serve as checks on each other. Lawyers advocate for their
clients and an executive branch agency asserts its own values, policy priori-
ties, and institutional culture through its prosecutorial choices, which are
checked by judicial decisions. Juvenile officers cannot be expected to ex-
ercise independent discretion in the way a separate agency would; as the Su-
preme Court of the United States said, "[I]t is quite evident that one who
holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon
to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will." 86 Placing
juvenile officers and their prosecutorial discretion in the judicial branch
erodes the executive branch's check on group think. In Missouri juvenile
courts, the Children's Division is unrepresented and the most important legal
decisions are turned over to the juvenile officer, who presents his recommen-
dations to his supervisor, not an independent arbiter.'8 Eroding this check
limits judges' ability to evaluate effectively competing perspectives that are
presented. The ABA has explained that judges are best able to render truly
independent decisions when they are evaluating recommendations presented
by various parties, not those from the court's own employees.' 88
There is also evidence that the juvenile officer's role erodes the check
on group think provided by counsel for children and their parents in delin-
183. See supra text following note 74.
184. See Breger, supra note 172, at 60-61, 72-77.
185. See id. at 75-77 (conceding that counsel advocates on behalf of clients, but
arguing that counsel choose "very risk averse" strategies to preserve their role in a
"clubby" atmosphere).
186. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935); see
also id. at 630 (describing the threat of termination as a "coercive influence").
Humphrey's Executor's focus on strict separation between different branches of gov-
ernment has fallen from favor. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 442-43 (1977) (adopting a "more pragmatic, flexible approach" than Humph-
rey's Executor). Still, Humphrey's Executor's observation on the impact of supervi-
sory authority on an employee's independence (or lack thereof) from that authority is
not seriously questioned.
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 16
("Judicial independence is increased when reviewing the individual case reports and
recommendations of executive agency officials as contrasted with those of the court's
own employees.").
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quency and abuse and neglect cases. In both categories of cases, juvenile
officers meet with individuals at the initial stages of litigation and advise
them of their right to counsel.189 The National Juvenile Defender Center's
2013 evaluation of Missouri's juvenile justice practice found that "[y]outh are
also encouraged to wind up their cases and plead out without counsel by
DJOs [deputy juvenile officers]."190 This phenomenon is exacerbated by
juvenile officers who believe that no defense lawyers are necessary, even at
detention hearings, because the juvenile officers "ha[ve] it covered."l 9' Fur-
thermore, many juvenile officers incorrectly advise youth that the juvenile
officer advocates for, rather than charges and prosecutes, the youth.192
Such beliefs could easily lead a juvenile officer to suggest - implicitly or
explicitly - to children and parents that they should waive their right to coun-
sel,1 9 3 thus depriving judges of the ability to render decisions based on an
adversarial hearing of the evidence.
Moreover, judges are often shaped by the organizational culture in
which they find themselves. Judges' reputations within juvenile court will be
influenced by the repeat players who appear before them regularly, and so
one would expect judges to respond, at least partially, to the expectations of
those repeat players.194 When judges arrive in juvenile court, they find an
existing courthouse culture - that is, a set of norms that are shared, even if
unspoken, by the group of professionals who handle cases within the court. 95
When beginning a new set of job responsibilities and encountering such an
organizational culture, judges, like other individuals, undergo a socialization
189. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
190. SCALI ET AL., supra note 136, at 40.
191. Id. at 44.
192. See id. at 38.
193. One parent's attorney reported observing juvenile officers implicitly suggest-
ing that parents waive counsel. Memorandum from Kathleen C. Dubois to Josh Gup-
ta-Kagan 2 (Feb. 15, 2013) (on file with author). "I have been present when a DJO
asked a parent if she thought she still needed a lawyer if her child was going to be
placed with the grandmother. Another DJO told a parent that if he received an attor-
ney he would probably be taxed by the county for the cost of representation." Id.
194. See Breger, supra note 172, at 74. This phenomenon may be particularly
powerful in "less visible" forums like juvenile courts. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES
AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 99-100 (2006). In
Missouri, the lawyers who appear regularly in front of judges literally shape their
evaluations by rating judges in surveys published by the Missouri Bar. Mo. Bar,
Missouri Judicial Performance Evaluations Available to the Public at
www.ShowMeCourts.org, MOBAR.ORG, http://www.mobar.org/news/2012/missouri-judicial-performance-evaluations-available-to-the-public-at-www.showmecourts.org.
htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). These ratings inform the Bar's recommendation to
voters regarding judicial retention elections. Id.
195. See Breger, supra note 172, at 63-64 (discussing the notion of organizational
or institutional culture within family court).
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process.196 It stands to reason that new juvenile court judges, especially those
unfamiliar with juvenile law, are at the greatest risk of deferring to this organ-
izational culture. Making the judge's own staff, both juvenile officers and
their attorneys, leading figures in that culture increases the social and psycho-
logical pressure on new judges to defer to that culture's norms and issue or-
ders that comport with juvenile officers' litigation positions.197 Further, new
judges relatively unfamiliar with the specialized subject matter are particular-
ly prevalent in juvenile court because judges frequently rotate in for four-year
assignments to the juvenile court.198
Third, Missouri law exacerbates critics' general concern that the juve-
nile officer's role increases the pressure felt by professional repeat players to
conform their decision-making to an individual judge's wishes. The juvenile
court judge has long been viewed as the "leader[] of the court 'team".199 who,
rather than passively and neutrally deciding disputes brought by parties with
whom they have no formal relationship, operates as a "charismatic leader,
problem solver, team manager, and judicial leader." 200 According to this
view, judges are more likely to give directions, implicitly or explicitly, to
members of their team, and those members are likely to feel pressure to
achieve some consensus consistent with judges' wishes.201 For example,
judges' power to appoint lawyers - and thus to give lawyers business - can
create pressure on such lawyers "to alter their behavior or demeanor before a
,,202particular judge in an attempt to secure future appointments. As with
group think concerns, this pressure should be counterbalanced by profession-
als' obligations to their own clients203 - a principle which should include the
196. See, e.g., Andreas Broschild, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of
Appeals More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 L. & Soc'Y REV. 171, 177
(2011) (describing how "new judges are socialized" upon arriving in the federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals).
197. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 1366, at 37 (questioning judges' neutrality and
independence when adjudicating petitions filed by their subordinates).
198. The statute governing the family court - of which the juvenile court is one
division - provides that family court judges "shall serve in such capacity for a term of
four years unless such judge's term is either extended such family court judge's option
or shortened with the agreement of the family court judge and the presiding judge."
Mo. REV. STAT. § 487.050.1 (2000).
199. ALFRED KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
CHILDREN'S COURT 98 (1953).
200. Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 270 (2008);
see also Fraidin, supra note 173, at 936-38.
201. See Breger, supra note 172, at 81-83.
202. Id. at 74.
203. Lawyers' obligations to their clients are weakened in child welfare cases by
Missouri's use of guardians ad litem to represent what they believe is in a child's best
interests. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 129.04, STANDARDS 3.0, 4.0. In juvenile delinquency
cases, lawyers represent children's wishes, and the ABA has recommended states
provide stated interests lawyers in child welfare cases. AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA MODEL
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priorities of an executive branch agency. And lawyers should have other
sources of business - full-time employment with executive branch agencies,
appointments from other judges, or other sources of clients (especially for
many of the solo practitioner and small firm attorneys who practice in Mis-
souri's juvenile courts). Missouri law erodes those protections because juve-
nile officers depend on judges for their jobs and are subject to both the judg-
es' legal rulings and managerial authority. Moreover, the juvenile officers'
role weakens the voice given to executive branch agency concerns because
the executive branch agency rarely appears with a lawyer, while the juvenile
officer generally does appear with a lawyer.
Fourth, informality in juvenile court can lead to both inappropriate ex
parte contacts and the appearance, if not the reality, of a skewed playing field;
the Missouri system worsens this problem. In family courts, generally, judg-
es, attorneys, and other repeat players have frequent ex parte conversations.204
As the ABA noted, this phenomenon is especially likely when the repeat
players that judges see include "their intake officers." 205 This risk both jeop-
206
ardizes due process and creates the appearance of impropriety, especially
among parties to juvenile court cases who see juvenile officers walking in and
out of courtrooms and remaining in courtrooms in between hearings before
207
the parties have any opportunity to see a judge. At least one outside group
studying one Missouri jurisdiction found that "informal communication be-
tween court practitioners may be viewed as having undue influence over for-
mal processes,"208 and one experienced juvenile court lawyer documented
209
multiple illustrations of ex parte contacts.
C. Specific Missouri Examples Illustrate the Harm ofPlacing Too
Much Power in the Judiciary
As a Missouri Bar publication gently put it, "Because the juvenile of-
ficer and staff serve under the direction of and at the pleasure of the juvenile
court judge, questions may legitimately be raised regarding their ability to
ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS (2011), available at http://www.isc.idaho.gov/cp/docs/
ABA%20Model%2OAct%20rep%20ofo20child%20in%20cp%20case.pdf.
204. See Breger, supra note 172, at 69.
205. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 16 (em-
phasis added).
206. See id.
207. See Breger, supra note 172, at 69.
208. ST. Louis CNTY. GREENBOOK INITIATIVE, SAFETY & ACCOUNTABILITY AUDIT
SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter GREENBOOK
INITIATIVE].
209. See Memorandum from Kathleen C. Dubois to Josh Gupta-Kagan, supra
note 193, at 1-2.
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render professional judgments independent of the judge's influence." 210 The-
oretical critiques of juvenile and family court practice suggest that placing
juvenile officers in the judiciary risks exacerbating bad practices in juvenile
courts nationally.211 Specific experiences within Missouri bring such con-
cerns into stark relief and aptly illustrate the potential and actual harms of the
separation of powers violation.
Judge Darrell Missey is the chief administrative judge of the Juvenile
Court of the 23rd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, which includes Jefferson
County, just south of St. Louis County.212 Judge Missey took the bench in
2003, after defeating his predecessor, Judge Carol Bader, in an election in the
211fall of 2002. Judge Missey has described how the court system he encoun-
tered both before and after his election illustrated the harms of the separation
of powers violation: juvenile officers filed petitions that the judge wanted
them to file and looked to the judge for supervisory guidance, and the judge
granted juvenile officers' petitions regardless of what other litigants would
214
say or do. There was both a real and perceived absence of fairness to liti-
gants other than the juvenile officer. Judge Missey wrote:
Our history in the Twenty-Third Circuit is demonstrative of the
possibility that even very good people could allow the combina-
tion of the prosecutorial and judicial roles to run amok. As a
practicing attorney, I observed the great difficulties which can
arise when the Juvenile Judge supervises the Juvenile Office
that prosecutes juvenile cases. In those days, Deputy Juvenile
Officers [DJOs] told me that the Judge established the criteria
for which cases would be pursued. When I would try to reason
with Deputy Juvenile Officers about exercising some level of
discretion, compassion, or restraint, they would often tell me
that the Judge expected them to take their hard-line stance.
210. Mo. Juvenile Law § 1.14 (MoBar 4th ed. 2011).
211. See supra Part IV.B.
212. See Mo. Supreme Court, Jefferson, Judicial Circuit 23, YOUR MO. CTS.,
http://www.courts.mo.gov/pagejsp?id=1620 (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
213. Judge Missey has cited his concern for juvenile court practices under Judge
Bader as the reason for his candidacy, stating in March 2012: "It was 10 years ago
today that I was thinking about filing to run and it was this month, March of 2002,
that I filed and ran. The reason I did it was because as a private practicing attorney I
was concerned about our local juvenile system and what was happening there." Judge
Darrell Missey, Remarks at the 12th Annual Access to Equal Justice Colloquium -
Evolving Standards in Juvenile Justice: From Gault to Graham and Beyond, WASH.
U. (Mar. 23, 2012), http://mediasite.law.wustl.edulMediasiteNiewer/?peid=461e58
6a89cf41 a9aaac9b3097e23c48 [hereinafter Missey, Remarks].
214. See Memorandum from Judge Darrell Missey to Representative Rory El-
linger, Josh Gupta-Kagan, and the Mo. Bar Ass'n Family Court Comm., supra note
25, at 6-7.
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Workers from the Division of Family Services (now known as
Children's Division) would complain to me that the DJOs dis-
couraged them from recommending placements of children with
relatives because the Judge had given the directive that such
placements were not to be favored. In ten years of practicing in
that Court, I never saw the Juvenile Office lose a case, hearing,
motion, or even an objection.[ 215] How could litigants expect to
prevail when the judge directed which cases would be prosecut-
ed? I continue to believe that the Judge and DJOs were good
people acting in good faith. The problem arose from a system
in which the Judge actively supervises DJOs regarding their ex-
ecutive functions, such as the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion. . . . After I took the bench, my belief about the awesome
power of the Juvenile Judge was confirmed. Almost instantly,
the juvenile system in Jefferson County began to take on my
personality. Juvenile Office personnel regularly inquired about
what policies I would like to see followed. Though I told them
to do what they thought just, I still believed they were trying to
please me as their supervisor. Across the system, people
seemed to change how they exercised their executive functions
based on what they perceived I expected from them. Such
power over executive functions should not reside with the per-
son who will determine whether those actions comply with the
law. As I hear people talk about the differences in juvenile
courts from circuit to circuit, it occurs to me that those juvenile
courts take on the personality and philosophy of their judges,
too.216
Judge Missey describes a scenario in which juvenile officers took
a "hard-line" position - filing more cases, removing more children, and
avoiding recommendations to place those children with extended family
members - because that is what their supervisor, the judge, wanted.2 17 It is
215. Judge Missey is not alone in reporting extreme levels of deference to juvenile
officers. One juvenile defense attorney reported one instance in seven years of
practice ofajudge ruling against ajuvenile officer. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 136,
at 52.
216. Memorandum from Judge Darrell Missey to Representative Rory Ellinger,
Josh Gupta-Kagan, and the Mo. Bar Ass'n Family Court Comm., supra note 25, at 6-
7 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 6. Some family preservation advocates saw things the same way.
When Judge Missey won the election, one organization celebrated the "change and
hope in Jefferson County" from Judge Bader's "heavy hand and unwavering lack of
respect and due process for natural families" to Judge Missey, who they expected
would be different. Brenda Browning, Change and Hope in Jefferson County, THE
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not hard to envision how a similar result could occur as juvenile officers seek
to please a supervising judge from the opposite side of the child welfare polit-
ical spectrum. Consider, for instance, a judge who is well known for his sup-
port of children staying with their biological families, such as Judge Jimmie
Edwards of St. Louis City.218 Press reports suggest that under Judge Ed-
wards' leadership, particular fact patterns were handled differently in St. Lou-
is City than in neighboring counties. For instance, in St. Louis County, in
219
utero drug exposure without more is often enough to trigger a removal,
whereas in the City such children were not removed without more evidence
of abuse or neglect.220
The point here is not that a juvenile court in a particular judicial circuit
removes too many or too few children. Rather, these illustrations suggest that
an important and difficult legal issue - whether removing children is legally
permissible and in the children's best interests - is handled via judges' mana-
gerial authority to determine what cases are brought and which children are
removed. The debate regarding the proper balance between family integrity
and state intervention to protect children from familial abuse should be decid-
ed first by the General Assembly through the juvenile code, and then on a
case-by-case basis through petitions filed by the executive branch and adjudi-
cated by the judicial branch. The status quo, which sets that balance based on
the juvenile court judges and juvenile officers in each circuit, improperly
disempowers the General Assembly from effectively setting policy for the
state, and disempowers the executive branch from enforcing legislation in a
consistent and comprehensive manner.
This phenomenon exacerbates what Judge Missey called "justice by ge-
ography"221 - that is, significantly different practices in different jurisdictions
within a state that have the same statute and same governing case law. Not
only do different juvenile court circuits handle similar cases differently, but
FAMILY LIFELINE (VOCAL of Mo.), Spring 2003, at 3, available at http://vocal-
ofmo.org/Lifelineupd.pdf.
218. See Nancy Cambria, City judge's defense of troubled families offends many
caseworkers, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:15 AM), http://www. stlto-
day.com/news/local/metro/city-judge-s-defense-of-troubled-families-offends-many-
caseworkers/article 3998737c-1 704-58b9-aadf-9b3b2ea998ec.html.
219. See Nancy Cambria, Safety cracks in Missouri foster policies, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 31, 2012, 10:15 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/lo-
cal/metro/safety-cracks-in-missouri-foster-policies/article d2900118-de9c-5f22-abe3-
33cce71104d8.html (describing a case in which the St. Louis County Juvenile Court
ordered a drug-exposed infant removed). In addition, the clinic I worked for was
involved in several St. Louis County cases involving removal of children based on in
utero drug exposure alone.
220. See id. (noting that under pressure from Judge Edwards, drug-exposed in-
fants are not removed from their parents without more evidence of abuse or neglect;
"Had the case been handled in St. Louis, rather than in St. Louis County, Shakur
likely would have remained with his parents.").
221. Missey, Remarks, supra note 213.
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the unusually large amount of power granted to juvenile court judges to hire,
supervise, and fire officials responsible for removing children and filing cases
undermines the legislative and executive branches' ability to shape a con-
sistent statewide policy. Missouri has chosen a state rather than county-
driven child welfare policy.222 Yet the power granted to juvenile officers
places a significant key to implementing child welfare policy in Missouri's
forty-five judicial circuits, each of which is led by its own judges and faces
no requirements (other than court decisions from higher courts) to operate
similarly to other systems across the state.
D. The Juvenile Officer's Role Disempowers the Executive Branch
Child Welfare Agency, Limiting Missouri's Ability to
Implement Child Welfare Policy
In Heckler, the Supreme Court of the United States articulated an ad-
ministrative expertise rationale for granting civil administrative agencies the
authority to determine when to file enforcement actions - those agencies have
expertise in the area and knowledge of available resources to determine when
legal violations occur and prioritize among various possible cases.223 This
argument applies strongly to the Children's Division, the executive branch
agency responsible for operating a comprehensive child welfare system. This
responsibility gives the Children's Division the perspective to determine
whether a court case or some other intervention is most likely to be effective
and worth the particular costs involved. That responsibility also makes the
juvenile officers' role particularly inappropriate in child welfare cases.
In child welfare cases, the juvenile officer's authority comes at the ex-
pense of the Children's Division. The Children's Division even lacks the
power to remove children facing an imminent risk of serious injury from
abuse or neglect; Missouri law grants that power to juvenile officers and law
enforcement and specifically excludes Children's Division officials from
exercising it224 - a statutory provision that distinguishes Missouri from other
225
states. As established above, juvenile officers' prosecutorial discretion is a
222. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.109 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
223. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
224. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.125.1-3 (2000).
225. Various statutes in other states empower their child protection agencies to
remove children in emergency situations. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-821
(West, Westlaw through the 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Special Sess. of the 51st Legis.);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 306 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 311 of the 2013 Reg.
Sess. & the 2013-2014 1st Ex. Sess. laws); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2309(a)(3)-(4)
(West 2001); FLA. STAT. § 39.401(1)(b) (2012); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1
(West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2-3 (West, Westlaw through 2013); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.29 (West, Westlaw through L.2013, c. 150 and J.R. No. 11); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT §1024(a) (West, Westlaw through L.2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-
500(a) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2013-220 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the Gen.
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power that resides with child protection agencies in sister states.226 Moreo-
ver, the Missouri Children's Division is a party to all child abuse and neglect
cases but, unlike juvenile officers, it generally does not appear at hearings
with counsel.227
This disempowerment is particularly striking in light of the Children's
Division's statutory charge to establish and operate a comprehensive child
228protection system for the entire state. The General Assembly has directed
the Children's Division to receive hotline calls alleging abuse or neglect,
to triage lower risk calls requiring an assessment and provision of voluntary
services and higher risk calls requiring immediate investigation, and to
maintain a registry of individuals found to have mistreated children. 229
The Children's Division must also provide services to families to avoid the
need for removals, 230 fulfilling a federal requirement that state administrative
agencies make "reasonable efforts" to prevent the need for removing chil-
dren.231 By law, the Children's Division contracts with various child welfare
agencies to operate a comprehensive child welfare system, including suffi-
cient foster homes, group homes, and other placements,232 and to ensure that
233
all such placements are properly licensed and monitored. The Children's
Division is responsible for searching for missing biological parents234 and
making diligent efforts to find grandparents and other extended family mem-
235bers of foster children. The Children's Division's parent agency, the De-
partment of Social Services, is charged with developing and operating state
plans necessary to obtain federal child welfare funds,236 triggering federal
237
statutory provisions that fill several pages of the United States Code. The
Assemb.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d
Called Sess. of the 83d Legis.).
226. See supra Part 1l.B.
227. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
228. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.109 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
229. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
230. §§ 210.109.2-3, 210.145.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i) (Supp. 2011). The Missouri statute even re-
quires the juvenile court to determine if the Children's Division made reasonable
efforts to prevent removal. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.183.1 (2000). The statute does not
explain how the Children's Division is supposed to make such efforts when reports
are filed with the court, not with the agency or when juvenile officers remove children
before such efforts can be made. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
232. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.112 (Supp. 2012).
233. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.486 (2000).
234. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.127 (Supp. 2012).
235. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.305 (Supp. 2012); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.565 (2000 &
Supp. 2012).
236. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.535 (Supp. 2012).
237. Congress has divided state plan elements into thirty-three separate para-
graphs in section 671(a), with many details that are well beyond the scope of this
Article. 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 - 679c (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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state cannot access federal child welfare funds for juvenile officers because
they are judicial officials.238
This list of the Children's Division's duties is only partial, but it suffices
to make the relevant point - now that the modem administrative state has
taken hold in the child welfare system, the General Assembly has charged the
Children's Division with creating and operating a complex, statewide child
welfare system. Yet, unlike its peer agencies in other states, the Children's
Division lacks authority over the most essential decisions within this system -
whether to remove children and whether to seek court approval for dramatic
state intervention in family life. 23 9
The Children's Division's duties give it a vantage point that no judicial
official can possess. The Children's Division has some familiarity with all
89,647 children who were subjects of child abuse and neglect reports in fiscal
year 2011.240 The Children's Division performs service assessments for more
than 39,000 of these children and investigates most of the rest.241 It substan-
tiates some allegations and not others, and opens voluntary "family-centered
services" cases for some families.242 It handles the relatively small number of
cases involving children - 6,216 - who entered foster care in 2011 following
243juvenile officers' decisions. By administering this continuum of responses
to alleged child maltreatment, the Children's Division is in the best position
to determine which response is most likely to achieve the best results in an
individual case or category of cases.
The statutory ability of individuals to circumvent the Children's Divi-
sion and make reports directly to juvenile officers creates a category of cases
exempted from the above scenario. Sources other than the Children's Divi-
sion made more than 5,000 referrals to juvenile officers in 2011.244 Juvenile
officers were then charged by law with determining how to proceed with
these referrals, without the benefit of the Children's Division's triage between
investigations and service assessments and without options for voluntary fam-
ily-centered services cases.
The Children's Division is also best positioned to understand the ser-
vices available to children and families after removal. Directly and through
238. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 448 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 2006).
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. Mo. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., CHILDREN'S DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2011 3 (2012), available at http://www.dss.mo.gov/re/pdf/cs/201 1-missouri-
childrens-division-annual-report.pdf [hereinafter CHILDREN'S DIVISION ANNUAL
REPORT].
241. Id. at 5.
242. See STATE OF MO. DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., CHILDREN'S DIV., STATEWIDE
ASSESSMENT 8 (2003), available at http://www.dss.mo.gov/cd/cfsr/firstround-
assessment.pdf [hereinafter STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT].
243. CHILDREN'S DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 240, at 41.
244. See MISSOURI JUVENILE AND FAMILY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
52, at 21.
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contracts, it operates foster homes, group homes, and other placements for
foster children and develops service plans for children and parents to aid their
reunification or, when necessary, find a new permanent family with whom
245the child will live. The Children's Division links foster children and their
parents to appropriate services and arranges visits between children and par-
246
ents. The Children's Division also bears the financial consequences of
providing all of these services - for instance, it employs and pays social
workers to manage cases; recruits, trains, licenses, and subsidizes foster
homes; and contracts with various agencies for specific services for foster
children.247 The Children's Division's responsibilities place it in a position to
evaluate whether the benefits obtained by removing a child are worth the
costs, especially when compared to other less invasive and less costly options
like providing family-centered services.
Conversely, placing prosecutorial discretion with juvenile officers ex-
emplifies the risk famously identified by psychologist Abraham Maslow, that
248those whose only tool is a hammer will see every problem as a nail. Juve-
nile officers have no options other than taking the most coercive steps - filing
a petition asking the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over and issue orders
to a child and family - or leaving a family alone.249 The Children's Division
has tools beyond a hammer in its proverbial tool belt - the power to work
with a family voluntarily after a family assessment (but no investigation) and
the power to work with a family voluntarily after a formal investigation.250
The Children's Division is thus better able to determine which tool is most
appropriate in each case. Indeed, by taking the hammer of filing juvenile
court cases and removing children from the Children's Division's belt, Mis-
souri law deprives the agency of the full range of tools available to its peer
agencies in other states. This may risk the possibility that the Children's Di-
vision views some cases as needing only voluntary services when a more
coercive approach may be necessary - thus jeopardizing children's safety.
Placing prosecutorial discretion in the executive branch would also help
various executive branch agencies coordinate responses to acts of child mal-
treatment. A single act of abuse can give rise to multiple cases - a child pro-
tection case in juvenile court and a criminal case against the parent - that
245. See STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT, supra note 242, at 8-11.
246. See id. at 19.
247. See id. at 72-73.
248. ABRAHAM MASLOW, PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE: A RECONNAISSANCE 15
(1966) ("1 suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat every-
thing as if it were a nail.").
249. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. Juvenile officers can also
choose an "informal adjustment" for a child - essentially a directed to stay out of
trouble or else the juvenile officer will file a petition. See supra note 56 and accom-
panying text. This variation on the juvenile officer's charging authority does not
change the binary nature of the decision.
250. Supra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
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ought to be coordinated.251 When an act of abuse leads to a child's removal
from an abusive parent and the initiation of a juvenile court case, authorities
must decide whether to prosecute the parent simultaneously with the juvenile
court prosecution or to drop a possible criminal prosecution out of concern
for its impact on the juvenile court case - if, for instance, a criminal prosecu-
tion could interfere with a parent's rehabilitation or a child's visits with a
parent.252 In some cases, the criminal prosecutor might threaten prosecution
if a parent does not engage in treatment and rehabilitation, or in other cases,
the prosecutor may promise to drop charges if such treatment and reunifica-
tion proceed effectively.253 With juvenile court and criminal prosecutors
placed in different branches of government, such coordination is more diffi-
cult; the proverbial right and left hands are not even attached to the same
body, and thus working in unison is more difficult. The absence of coordina-
tion has been documented in Missouri juvenile courts254 and can lead to
harmful results.255 For instance, there are often cases of physical abuse in
which a child is removed, parents receive treatment and rehabilitate, and then
reunification occurs - all through a juvenile court process run by judicial
branch staff. A criminal prosecution could thwart reunification goals if or-
ders in that case interfere with a child's visits with his parent or if a parent
faces an overly punitive sentence imposed without consideration of the effect
on the child victim. The county prosecutor could even decide to press an
assault charge against the parent as reunification is occurring, placing the
parent in jail and re-traumatizing the child with another separation. If prose-
cutorial authority in child abuse and neglect cases is placed in the executive
branch rather than the judicial branch, then all prosecutors will work for the
same agency and can more easily coordinate their actions.256
Finally, one ought not fear increased authority in a political branch of
government. Judge Missey has suggested that the Children's Division prose-
251. Congress has required certifications that state child protection and law
enforcement agencies can cooperate when necessary. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)
(xi) (2006).
252. See Marcia Sprague & Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and Criminal
Court Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 35 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 239,
246 (1997) (noting how a non-contact order in a criminal case can conflict with a
visitation order in a civil case).
253. See id. at 245 (describing how the threat of criminal penalties may help in-
duce parents to cooperate with rehabilitative services).
254. See Memorandum from Kathleen C. Dubois to Josh Gupta-Kagan, supra
note 193, at 2 (describing case in which a prosecutor and a juvenile officer took con-
flicting action regarding visitation with a parent believed to have molested his child).
255. See Sprague & Hardin, supra note 252, at 242 ("Unless there is coordination
between these two proceedings, there are duplications of effort, inconsistent deci-
sions, wasted resources, and needless trauma to child victims.").
256. 1 do not suggest that law enforcement and child protection agencies will
magically collaborate - only that it will be easier to do so if they are in the same
branch of government.
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cutorial discretion could be unwise because that agency, like any executive
branch agency, is subject to control by elected officials and therefore "poli-
cies may emerge that are based on politics rather than good sense."257 It is
not clear, however, why political accountability and checks and balances
between branches of government are less connected to good sense than con-
centrating power in the judicial branch. Greater executive branch control
should lead to enhanced transparency and efficiency as well as a more con-
sistent statewide policy.258 The executive branch's choices about where to
devote limited resources would be subject to legislative oversight, and deci-
sions to prosecute individual cases would be subject, of course, to judicial
review - more impartial judicial review than is currently applied to petitions
filed by the judiciary.
One example from my clinic's docket illustrates how current law disem-
powers the Children's Division and how that can lead to bad results. The St.
Louis County Juvenile Court appointed our clinic as guardian ad litem
for two children whose mother was assaulted by her boyfriend at her boy-
friend's home. The police arrested both the boyfriend and the mother259 and
took custody of the children, who were watching television in the next room
during the assault. The juvenile officer filed a petition, obtained a temporary
judicial custody order, and sought a protective custody order - an order plac-
257. Memorandum from Judge Darrell Missey to Representative Rory Ellinger,
Josh Gupta-Kagan, and the Mo. Bar Ass'n Family Court Comm., supra note 25.
Judge Missey went on to make the entirely reasonable point that Missouri policy
makers should "carefully consider[]" where juvenile officers or their authority might
go. Id.
258. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2331-46 (2001) (arguing that strong presidential - that is, political - control over
executive branch agencies increases both effectiveness and transparency of agencies'
operations). Moreover, empirical work in related contexts finds better results for
children when executive branch agencies have more authority to alter their practice to
serve families' needs. Researchers have found a correlation between a dedicated
child welfare property tax levy in some Ohio counties and higher adoption rates and
lower foster care populations. Susan Vivian Mangold & Catherine Cerulli, Follow the
Money: Federal, State, and Local Funding Strategies for Child Welfare Services and
the Impact of Local Levies on Adoptions in Ohio, 38 CAP. U.L. REV. 349, 374-82
(2009); see also Susan Vivian Mangold et al., Using Community-Based Participatory
Research to Study the Relationship Between Sources and Types of Funding and Men-
tal Health Outcomes for Children Served by the Child Welfare System in Ohio, 21 J.L.
& POL'Y 113, 114 (2012). The dedicated tax provides local child welfare agencies
with flexibility to use the relevant money as they saw fit, and with this authority were
able to help more children leave foster care to permanent families. See Mangold &
Cerulli, supra note 258, at 354.
259. The mother had defended herself and both she and the boyfriend had injuries,
making it hard for the police to determine who was at fault. Missouri statutes suggest
that instead of arresting both adults, the police should have determined who was "the
primary physical aggressor" and arrested only that person. Mo. REv. STAT. §
455.085.3 (Supp. 2012).
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ing the children in foster care until the petition could be adjudicated.
We have no record of Children's Division's involvement until this temporary
custody order placed our clients in the agency's custody; this case was likely
one of the forty-four percent of juvenile court referrals that bypassed the
Children's Division and went straight to juvenile officers.260 The Children's
Division thus had no opportunity to make reasonable efforts to prevent
261the need for placing the children in foster care. By the time of the protec-
tive custody hearing four days later, the mother was released from jail and not
charged with any crime. She returned to her home and was willing to keep
her abusive boyfriend away from her children; there were therefore
no grounds to separate the children from their mother (a position which we
took and the judge adopted). The juvenile officer, however, sought protect-
tive custody.
In the courtroom hallway before the hearing, members of the clinic ap-
proached the Children's Division worker. She explained in animated tones
that she did not support the juvenile officer's request for protective custody.
She shared our perspective that the children's mother was out of jail, lived
apart from the abuser, and would protect the children, whom she had cared
for well prior to the assault. We urged her to share this view with the judge
during the hearing, and she agreed. But when the hearing started, her tone
and substance changed. The judge asked her what her position was regarding
protective custody. She responded in a much softer voice than she used in the
hallway, saying that she would "defer to the judgment of the court." Thank-
fully the judge pressed her for a direct answer, and she explained, still softly,
that she did not think protective custody was necessary.
After this hearing, the case worker made clear that she was prepared to
close the case. We agreed with that position; the children had a fit parent
who was acting appropriately to protect them and we saw no legal basis for
ongoing court jurisdiction. The juvenile officer, however, refused to drop the
petition for two months, imposing court intervention on this family for that
period of time. This action also took up the case worker's time, limiting her
ability to work on more pressing matters.
This brief case raises deep questions illustrating how the juvenile of-
ficer's role disempowers the Children's Division. Why should the juvenile
officer rather than the Children's Division have the authority to seek protec-
tive custody and initiate proceedings that invade the family's life for several
months, when the Children's Division had not investigated the case, did not
have the opportunity to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal, and did
not believe that these proceedings or foster care were necessary to keep the
child safe? At the very least, this case illustrates how the absence of counsel
for the Children's Division makes it harder for the Children's Division to
advocate forcefully; what would the case worker have said had we not prod-
260. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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ded her to advocate her position? Had the Children's Division worker felt
empowered to try to convince the juvenile officer not to file a petition in this
case? If not, why not? And if so, why did the juvenile officer overrule the
Children's Division's judgment? These questions illustrate the concerns re-
garding the juvenile officer's power, and the Children's Division's relative
powerlessness, in child welfare cases under existing Missouri law.
E. The Current System Wastes Money in Child Welfare Cases
One might argue that the Children's Division, working effectively with
juvenile officers, can, and in some circuits does, avoid some of the problems
identified by ensuring that juvenile officers defer to agency expertise when
exercising prosecutorial discretion. Even if this perspective is accurate in
some circuits, it illustrates a final harm - the current system wastes precious
financial resources, which the government could spend more effectively, by
paying juvenile officers to duplicate the Children's Division's work.
The juvenile officer has no responsibility that could not be performed by
the Children's Division, the judge, or the guardian ad litem; the juvenile of-
ficer is, as one advocate put it, "Missouri's fifth wheel."262 The Children's
Division, in operating the statewide child abuse and neglect hotline, investi-
gates abuse and neglect allegations and recommends particular actions based
263
on those investigations. The juvenile officer makes recommendations as to
what he or she believes is in the best interest of the child - a standard also
applied by the judge, the Children's Division case worker, and the child's
guardian ad litem. The juvenile officer may also consider the interests of the
state - just as the state official, the Children's Division case worker, does. 264
Moreover, the juvenile officer takes on these roles with inferior access
265to information. The juvenile officer lacks the Children's Division's
knowledge of available placements and services that that agency can provide.
The juvenile officer also lacks the significant out-of-court contact with chil-
dren and families that the Children's Division social workers develop; for
instance, the juvenile officer does not typically observe parent-child visits or
receive direct updates from therapists and other service providers. Finally,
the juvenile officer lacks the guardian ad litem's lawyer-client relationship
with the child and so should not be expected to have any greater insight into
the child's wishes or needs.
262. RICHARD WEXLER, NAT'L COAL. FOR CHILD PROTECTION REFORM, THE
ROAD LESS TRAVELED BY: TOWARD REAL REFORM OF CHILD WELFARE IN MISSOURI
54 (2d ed. 2003), available at http://www.nccpr.org/reports/roadlesstraveledby.pdf.
263. See STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT, supra note 242, at 8.
264. Indeed, the Children's Division is better able to represent the interests of the
state because of its place in the executive branch and its broader portfolio.
265. When the Children's Division manages cases, juvenile "officers often have
only the CD worker's reports and no direct knowledge or information about a case."
Mo. Juvenile Law §§ 6.37, 6-78 1.12 (MoBar 4th ed. 2011).
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The money at stake is not de minimis. The number of child abuse and
neglect cases requires substantial expenditures on juvenile officers. More
than 6,200 children entered foster care in fiscal year 2011,266 and each child
removed from a parent or custodian and placed in foster care required a peti-
tion from a juvenile officer. Even larger numbers of children have open cases
each year - more than 15,000 children were in the Children's Division's cus-
tody at some point in fiscal year 2011.267 The number of children in foster
care at any given time is lower - a little over 10,000.268 Each of these chil-
dren has an open juvenile court case in which a juvenile officer writes and
files reports and attends hearings, and some have termination of parental
rights or other permanency trials in which juvenile officers often prosecute
the petition.
Conservative estimates suggest that Missouri taxpayers spend millions
of dollars annually on juvenile officers for child abuse and neglect cases
alone.269 The Missouri Office of State Courts Administrator provides data
points necessary to estimate the total number of juvenile officers required for
the current child welfare cases. That office reports 130.8 monthly hours han-
dling cases for a full-time employee and estimates that child welfare cases
270take 2.2 hours per month. One juvenile officer could therefore handle just
under sixty child welfare cases at any given time, and the state would need
167 juvenile officers to handle the entire workload of children in foster
care.271 If these employees cost state and county governments $45,000 each
266. CHILDREN'S DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 240, at 41.
267. Id. at 45. The number of open cases is much larger than the number of chil-
dren who enter foster care each year because the average length of stay in foster care
is long - 23.1 months, with more than 4,600 children remaining in foster care longer
than two years. Id. at 65. The 15,000 children is the number of children who were in
the Children's Division's custody. Id. at 45.
268. Foster Care Statistical Information, Mo. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., http://www.
dss.mo.gov/cd/fostercare/fpstats.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). The number of
children in foster care over the course of a year is higher than the number at any given
time because children move in and out of foster care throughout the year. See id.
269. The calculations that follow reflect my best estimates based on available
data. I concede that these are estimates only and may over- or under-estimate the true
cost. I offer these estimates to demonstrate only that the financial cost involved is not
de minimis.
270. MISSOURI JUVENILE AND FAMILY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 52,
at 42.
271. 130.8 hours per employee divided by 2.2 is 59.45 cases handled by an em-
ployee at a given time. 10,000 cases open at a given time divided by 60 cases per
employee is 166.67. This calculation excludes cases involving children who are liv-
ing with a parent and thus not in foster care but who are subject to an ongoing juve-
nile court case. This calculation also excludes any supervisory or support staff neces-
sary for juvenile officers.
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per year including salary, benefits, retirement costs, and office overhead,272
taxpayers pay $7,515,000 annually for juvenile officers. Juvenile officers'
workloads may frequently stretch beyond the sixty cases per employee stand-
ard suggested by the court administrator. For instance, in St. Louis County
the juvenile court lists eleven juvenile officers handling child protection cas-
es.273 St. Louis County had 1,317 children in foster care in fiscal year 2011,
274
or about 880 at any point in time, for an average of eighty cases per em-
ployee.275 If that average caseload held across the state, there would be 125
juvenile officers handling 10,000 open cases, at an annual cost to taxpayers of
$5,625,000. This cost is split between the state and county government be-
cause the statute directs the state to reimburse some of the costs in most judi-
cial circuits.276
On the scale of public expenditures, these figures represent a small por-
tion of Missouri's overall budget, which is measured in the billions of
dollars.277 That fact, however, does not excuse policy makers from justifying
all expenditures, especially in an era of budget cuts to services that benefit
278
many of the low income families who populate juvenile court cases.
Spending millions of dollars to add an extra player to cases that already have
279
multiple professionals - a judge, lawyers, a social worker, and often thera-
272. Starting salaries for recently posted jobs are in the low $30,000s. See, e.g.,
Employment Opportunity, http://www.mjja.org/images/jobs/2012/10.09.12-2.pdf
(advertising a starting salary range of $31,800 - $34,092). These are starting salaries
only, and more experienced juvenile officers and supervisors presumably earn thou-
sands more annually. These are full time jobs with benefits, so health care, retire-
ment, and other benefits costs are assumed. Id.
273. Family Court of St. Louis County, Child Protective Services staff listing (on
file with author). This figure does not include the director, a "unit secretary," or the
coordinator of the "SAFETI program," the drug court in St. Louis County.
274. Statewide, there were more than 15,000 children in foster care at some point
in FY 2011, but just over 10,000 at a single point in time. See supra notes 267-268
and accompanying text. Applying the same ratio to St. Louis County yields about
878 cases open at any given time.
275. 880 cases divided by 11 juvenile officers equals 80 cases per juvenile officer.
276. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.393.2(2)(a), (4)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2012). In multi-
county judicial circuits - which exist in more rural and less populated areas, the state
pays the full costs ofjuvenile officers. § 211.393.3(3).
277. Missouri's budget includes total expenditures of almost $23 billion, includ-
ing $8 billion in general revenue, $7.4 billion in federal funds, and $7.6 billion in
"other funds." See MO. OFFICE OF ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2013
BUDGET 2 (2012), available at http://oa.mo.gov/bp/pdffiles/2013presspacket.pdf.
278. See, e.g., MO. BUDGET PROJECT, CUTTING TO THE CHASE: WHAT MULTI-
YEAR BUDGET REDUCTIONS MEAN FOR MISSOURIANS - EDUCATION AND HEALTH
SERVICES SUFFER BIGGEST LOSSES, available at http://mobudget.org/files/mpb-
full%20report.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
279. See Sinden, supra note 174, at 353 ("Indeed, the sheer number of lawyers
and social workers involved in a single family's case can be mind-boggling."). One
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pists, other service providers, and a court appointed special advocate - is
difficult to justify.28 0
The state, counties, and judicial circuits could spend these funds more
effectively in any number of other areas. For instance: courts could invest in
model legal representation programs for both parents and children. To pro-
vide model representation, such programs require an investment in lawyers,
supervisors, training, and multidisciplinary staff. But such investments pay
off, as high quality lawyers are proven to hasten children's exit from foster
homes, reunification with their parents, and adoption or guardianship with a
new, permanent family.281 Such results both serve children's interests and
save public dollars that would otherwise be spent on foster care and ongoing
juvenile court cases. More modestly, the money could pay parents' attorneys
to litigate paternity, custody, or order of protection cases that arise out of -
and are often necessary to resolve - child abuse or neglect cases. Indigent
parents' inability to pay for such legal services often delays resolution of
282juvenile court cases.
V. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
The Missouri General Assembly should reform the juvenile court struc-
ture to correct the problems created by the juvenile officers' role. The courts
may, of course, play a role in this reform. In many cases, lawyers for parents
and children facing child abuse or neglect allegations and lawyers for chil-
audit of St. Louis County Juvenile Court's handling of cases involving domestic vio-
lence found that "Family encounters many professionals, sometimes resulting in con-
fusion about what is expected of them to retain or regain their children." GREENBOOK
INITIATIVE, supra note 208, at 5.
280. These expenditures lead to the employment of many dedicated individuals.
Eliminating those expenditures means laying off those individuals - a difficult pro-
spect, especially when the individuals at issue have committed their careers to an
important and difficult field. That reality should not prevent a clear analysis of
whether these expenditures are worthwhile, and whether those individuals might serve
children and families more effectively in other positions.
281. The most rigorous study available compares more than 12,000 children's
foster care cases from 2004 to 2008. See Mark E. Courtney & Jennifer L. Hook,
Evaluation of the Impact of Enhanced Parental Legal Representation on the Timing
of Permanency Outcomes for Children in Foster Care, 34 CHILDREN & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 1337, 1337 (2012). The study compares results both between counties
implementing a model parent representation project and those without such a project,
and within counties implementing the model representation project before and after
the project's initiation. Id. at 1339-40. The study found that reunifications occurred
11 percent faster, adoptions 104 percent faster, and guardianships 83 percent faster.
Id at 1342.
282. See Annette Appell & Josh Gupta-Kagan, Representing Children at the
Intersection of Domestic Violence and Child Protection, 59 ST. Louis B.J. 26,
31 (2012).
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dren facing juvenile delinquency charges should move to dismiss petitions
filed by juvenile officers for violations of the Missouri Constitution's separa-
tion of powers provisions. But a judicial decision adopting such a theory
would likely only rule that the present system violates separation of powers.
Such a ruling would require legislative action to determine which individuals
or entities should take on the juvenile officers' role. The General Assembly
is best suited to reform the many portions of the juvenile code discussing
juvenile officers and to make decisions regarding how to most effectively
reallocate resources devoted to child welfare juvenile officers. This section
will outline steps the General Assembly should take - ideally without waiting
for a judicial imperative - and argue why partial reforms will not address the
problem adequately.
A. Potential Comprehensive Reforms
The legislative solution differs between child welfare cases and juvenile
delinquency cases. Child welfare cases have an executive branch agency -
the Children's Division - charged with operating a comprehensive statewide
child welfare system. 28 3 The General Assembly should eliminate the juvenile
officers' role in child welfare cases and empower the Children's Division to
remove children in emergency situations and to file and prosecute child abuse
and neglect petitions. This would involve eliminating the child protection
juvenile officer positions across the state, achieving the cost savings outlined
above,284 and moving attorneys who currently represent juvenile officers in
child welfare cases from the judicial branch to the executive branch. Those
attorneys would then be employed directly by the Children's Division or the
state executive branch so they can best assist their clients in implementing a
statewide child welfare policy.
Juvenile justice is more complicated because no single agency operates
a comprehensive juvenile justice system, and thus there is no obvious candi-
date for taking on the juvenile officer's prosecutorial discretion. Police de-
partments investigate crimes in which juveniles are implicated and make ar-
rests of juvenile suspects. The Division of Youth Services (like the Chil-
dren's Division, a subdivision of the Department of Social Services) is
charged with taking care of children adjudicated delinquent who are commit-
ted to its custody and manages some delinquency prevention and treatment
services; unlike the Children's Division, it is not responsible for investigating
allegations of juvenile delinquency or determining which cases need a more
or less invasive response.285 Juvenile officers - like probation officers in
adult criminal cases - supervise juveniles found guilty of delinquent acts who
283. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
284. See supra Part I.E.
285. Mo. REV. STAT. § 219.016.2 (2000).
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are subject to a disposition of probation (but not commitment to Division of
Youth Services custody).
Moreover, the juvenile court's therapeutic aims rightly affect how a
prosecutorial authority exercises its discretion; transferring such authority to
local prosecutors or any office that lacks experience with such therapeutic
goals risks triggering an overly punitive attitude towards juvenile offenders.
Whether to file charges against a juvenile, what precise charges to allege, and
what dispositions to seek are decisions that call for consideration of what
actions will best help youths rehabilitate.
The simplest solution 286 might be for the General Assembly to keep
the juvenile office roughly as it is, but remove it from judicial branch control;
juvenile officers could then constitutionally exercise prosecutorial discretion
so long as someone other than judges has the authority to hire, supervise,
and fire them. The General Assembly could further create a commission of
juvenile justice experts from a variety of fields - such as law, social work,
psychology, and law enforcement - and charge that committee with hiring
chief juvenile officers287 in each judicial circuit or recommending a slate
of potential chief juvenile officers to county executives.288 Such a commis-
sion could also be responsible for renewing chief juvenile officers' appoint-
ments after a several-year term and, in rare cases, dismissing or suspending
chief juvenile officers for misconduct. Such a structure could insulate
juvenile officers from political pressures that diverge from the juvenile
court's therapeutic goals, while separating juvenile officers from the judicial
control that creates separation of powers problems. The key feature that
resolves the separation of powers problem is to dissociate the hiring and su-
pervision of juvenile officers from the judges in front of whom they file and
prosecute petitions. Even if such a commission were nominally located in the
judicial branch, it would not raise the same separation of powers concerns as
the current structure.289
286. I do not suggest that this is the only solution. Any legislative reform that
separates juvenile prosecutorial authority from the judiciary while charging such
authority with exercising its prosecutorial discretion in light of the juvenile law's
therapeutic goals would satisfactorily address the concerns identified in this Article.
287. Chief juvenile officers would then be responsible for hiring and supervising
subordinate juvenile officers and hiring legal counsel to represent juvenile officers.
288. The latter option is analogous to Missouri's structure for selecting judges, in
which a nonpartisan commission submits three individuals to the governor, who ap-
points one individual to fill judicial vacancies in certain large jurisdiction trial courts
and in appellate courts. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25(a).
289. Nominally "judicial" entities that operate apart from the control of judges,
such as the United States Sentencing Commission, have survived separation of pow-
ers attacks. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393-94 (1989).
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B. Partial Reforms Will Not Suffice
One might argue that the problems identified in this Article can be
addressed without shifting prosecutorial discretion from the judicial branch to
the executive branch. Juvenile officers need only "guard against subjugating
their professional integrity" to judges' wishes.290 And judges who are sensi-
tive to the separation of powers problems inherent in the juvenile officer role
can separate the judge's role from the juvenile office. Judge Missey, for
example, has relayed how he directed the Jefferson County juvenile officer
that "this is your office. You run it."291 Judge Missey ceded administrative
duties regarding the family court - including supervising the juvenile of-
292ficers - to a judge who does not hear family court cases. As a result, he
observed, "[N]ow none of those juvenile officers think that I'm their boss.
They can file what they think is right and I can overrule them, which I do
from time to time." 293
Such steps are an improvement to the statutory structure, but they are
inadequate to address the concerns raised above. Without changing the statu-
tory assignment of prosecutorial discretion from the judiciary to the executive
branch, there is no guarantee that a future juvenile court judge will manage
the juvenile office differently. Even if Judge Missey is right that, currently,
juvenile officers do not think that he is their boss, the statute in fact makes
him their boss, and no legal bar prevents a future judge from exercising that
role. Judge Missey implicitly acknowledged this point, arguing that the steps
he took in Jefferson County worked well, but that placing prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the executive branch would be "more appropriate."294
Moreover, the steps taken in Jefferson County do not address certain
problems. They do nothing to reduce the appearance of impropriety to liti-
gants when they see a judicial branch employee filing and prosecuting cases
in front of them to be adjudicated by a judge. In addition, they neither
properly empower the executive branch, nor save taxpayers' money, nor redi-
rect funds to more helpful purposes.
290. Mo. Juvenile Law § 1.14 (MoBar 4th ed. 2011).
291. Missey, Remarks, supra note 213.
292. Id.
293. Id. See also Memorandum from Judge Darrell Missey to Representative
Rory Ellinger, Josh Gupta-Kagan, and the Mo. Bar Ass'n Family Court Comm.,
supra note 25, at 7 ("In Jefferson County, we have attempted to address my concern
about Separation of Powers by dividing the juvenile docket between two judges
and placing the administrative duties with the Administrative Judge of the Family
Court, who does not hear Juvenile cases. This separation has worked well, but it
would be more appropriate if the Juvenile Office would be in the Executive Branch
where it belongs.").
294. Memorandum from Judge Darrell Missey to Representative Rory Ellinger,
Josh Gupta-Kagan, and the Mo. Bar Ass'n Family Court Comm., supra note 25.
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VI. CONCLUSION: REFORMING MISSOURI'S JUVENILE COURT
STRUCTURE
The Supreme Court of the United States ordered the constitutional do-
mestication of juvenile courts two generations ago.295 It is now past time for
Missouri juvenile courts to respect basic separation of powers principles.
These principles have protected individual liberty since the nation's founding,
and no basis exists to exempt juvenile law from them. Indeed, the unusually
high stakes in juvenile court favor a rigorous application of these fundamental
protections of individual and family liberty.
A core element of Missouri's juvenile court structure must be reformed.
Giving the juvenile officer - a judicial branch official who is hired and super-
vised by juvenile court judges - prosecutorial discretion violates the separa-
tion of powers doctrines, creates a system in which individual judges wield
far too much authority, exacerbates dangerous practices in juvenile courts,
and removes power from administrative agencies to implement fully a com-
prehensive statewide child welfare system. Moreover, the juvenile officers'
role in Missouri juvenile courts wastes precious taxpayer dollars that could
achieve much better results if directed elsewhere.
The problem lies in Missouri's juvenile code, and so the solution lies
with one of two actions. The General Assembly should amend the code to
abolish juvenile officers and move prosecutorial discretion to the executive
branch. Absent such legislative action, the Missouri courts should declare the
present system unconstitutional. Advocates for children and families should
press the issue in both legislative and judicial forums.
295. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
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